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It is intended that Chapter I will explain the
rationale for this thesis on the subject of the Truth in
Negotiations Act. This chapter will also present the
thesis organization, methodology, scope and limits, and a
brief introduction to the purpose of Government procure-
ment. The research question and subsidiary questions,
whose answers it will be the goal of this paper to uncover,
will also be stated.
The primary objective of Government contracting is
to obtain the necessary supplies and services at a fair and
reasonable price, calculated to result in the lowest overall
cost to the Government. This objective can be reached by
either of two procurement methods: (1) formally advertised,
or (2) negotiated. Congress, the sole appropriator of
Government monies, has expressed a distinct preference for •
the formal advertising method. This method is believed to
be superior because it generally provides a more competitive
basis for the awarding of a contract and, therefore, affords
U.S., Department of Defense, Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations, The 1969 Edition (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1968), par. 3-801.1. Cited
hereafter as ASPR.

the greatest protection to Government funds. Congress,
recognizing that all procurements cannot be accomplished by
formally advertising for bids from qualified sources has per-
mitted an alternative, the use of the negotiated method of
procurement.
Purpose of Thesis
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze one legis-
lative act that was designed to ensure that the Government
employee who negotiates contracts for the procurement of goods
or services for the Government has accurate, complete, and
current cost or pricing data available. This is to ensure a
knowledge level on a par with the contractor and to result in
an effective contract negotiation. It is the belief of the
Congress that the Government's negotiator must rely on con-
tractor supplied cost or pricing data, and that it must be
reliable in order to protect the taxpayers' money. As a means
of ensuring the reliability of the cost or pricing data the
contractor is required to certify that his data are accurate,
complete, and current. This certification is required by
Public Law 87-653 when there is an absence of adequate price
competition or an established catalog or market price of
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the
general public.
In its simplest terms, with which there is no
dispute, the purpose of PL 87-653 is to ensure that truthful
data are available to both parties in the negotiation of

contracts for goods and services. This basic idea has caused
a considerable amount of consternation in and out of Govern-
ment. The forword to a recent book on the Law describes the
situation as ". . . unlike many congressional enactments
which cause a brief flurry of activity followed by a subsi-
dence into administrative routine, the Truth in Negotiations
Act has led over time to more and still more confusion,
misunderstanding and dislocation."
The Participants
The passage of PL 87-653 heralded the beginning of a
many-sided conflict regarding the necessity for, and imple-
mentation of, this law to ensure truth in the negotiation of
Government contracts. The date of the passage into lav/ of
PL 87-653 was the culmination of seven years of Government
Accounting Office (GAO) investigative effort which included
numerous reports to Congress as well as hours of Congressional
testimony by GAO, the Department of Defense (DOD), and
industry. The principal adversaries in this continuing con-
flict for the effective implementation and enforcement are
GAO, in the role of watchdog for Congress and protector of
the taxpayers* monies; DOD, as the most prolific contract
writer and expender of Government funds; and industry, the
recipient of the contracts, the funds, and the profit.
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, The Truth
in Negotiations Act... a MAPI Symposium (Washington, D.C.:
Machinery and Allied Products Institute and Council for
Technological Advancement, 1969), P- iv.

Implementation
Since the inception of PL 87-6^3 there has been
difficulty on the part of the Government in obtaining
strict compliance with the Law. The difficulties have
occurred in Government as well as industry. Numerous reasons
for the difficulties have been given, two of which are
differences in interpretation of the intent of the Law, and
inadequate records of negotiation with resultant auditor
charges at a later date of failure to disclose pertinent
information.
Critical reports, by GAO, of noncompliance with the
law have produced numerous Congressional hearings. These
hearings combined with Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA) decisions have been responsible for stricter
interpretation and enforcement of the Law, clarification of
some questions about the Law and the surfacing of new
questions.
In an effort to comply with PL 87-653, both
Government and industry have instituted training programs
and symposiums to indoctrinate their employees and to examine
the purpose and effect of the Law's requirements. Preaward
surveys of contractor submitted cost or pricing data have
been augmented by postaward audits to determine if there is
compliance with the Law.

Scope and Limitations
The motivating question and primary purpose of this
thesis is to discern the reason "Why Public Law 87-653 is
so difficult to satisfy." This question applies equally to
Government and industry and will be viewed from each per-
spective. In order to arrive at a conclusion it will be
necessary to delve into the factors that motivated Congress
to pass the legislation and to determine from the legis-
lative history what Congress intended the Law to accomplish,
It will also be necessary to determine if the Law has been
fully implemented by Government and accepted by industry.
A final area of inquiry that could assist in arriving at a
conclusion is the effect of ASBCA decisions in clarifying
the requirements of PL 87-653.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to delve into
the legalistic basis or interpretation of PL 87-653;
rather, the Act will be viewed from the layman's position
with respect to its implementation and effects. The
question of the Law's effect upon subcontractors will be
avoided since, in general, the same problems exist in prime
contracts except for the added complication of appeal
rights
.
The period to be covered by this writing will be




The research question and its subsidiary questions
will be discussed and analyzed from information obtained
from:
1. Congressional hearings and reports.
2. GAO Reports to Congress.
3. Government training manuals and circulars.
k. Industry memorandums, symposiums and publications.
5. Personal interviews with Government and industry
employees that are involved in various aspects of
the utilization, enforcement, of the Truth in
Negotiations Act.
Inductive reasoning will be used to arrive at a conclusion
as to why the Law is so difficult to satisfy.
Organization
The contents of this thesis will be arranged in the
following sequence:
Chapter II presents the purpose and origin of PL 87-653,
the legislative history of the bill, and any subsequent
revisions to the law.
Chapter III discusses the steps taken to implement
PL 87-653 and the problems encountered by Government and
industry in the implementation of and conformance to the
Law. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, its
decisions, and their effect on implementation will be
discussed.
Chapter IV reviews the authority, evolution, and effect
of preaward and postaward auditing of cost or pricing data
submitted to Government negotiators. The auditing role of

GAO and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) are
compared and contrasted.
Chapter V surveys the efforts. of GAO to promote Govern-
ment agency enforcement and Congressional strengthening of
the Lav;.
Chapter VI will summarize the conclusions reached in
the foregoing chapters and answer the subsidiary questions





Chapter II will present the background for the
discussion of Public Law 87-653, commonly called the Truth
in Negotiations Act (H.R. 5532). The various procurement
methods permitted by Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR) will be reviewed, with particular attention paid to
the Negotiated method.
The purpose and origin of PL 87-653 and the motiva-
tion of the prime movers of the Law--GAO and the Honorable
Carl Vinson—will be discussed. The long legislative
process of hearings and the succession of proposals to
amend the Armed Services Procurement Act of 19^-7 will be
followed. The final passage of the bill and its revisions
will complete this chapter and set the stage for a discus-
sion of the implementation of the Act.
Background
Government procurement
Congress is historically tied to the principle of
competition in procurements as a means of ensuring that the
Government receives the best price in the purchase of goods
8

and services. Of particular concern to Congress is that
all bidders receive fair and equitable treatment at the
hands of the Government contracting officers. The oppor-
tunity for all firms, large and small, to participate in
contracts to provide goods and services to the Government
is of equal concern.
Congress, drawing on 150 years of Government procure-
ment experience, passed the Armed Services Procurement Act
in 194-7* This Act consolidated and revised the existing laws
relating to military procurements and placed in one set of
regulations, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR) , all of the authority and limitations for military
procurement. The original purpose of the 194-7 Procurement
Act was to reestablish the primacy of the competitive Formal
Advertising method of procurement in the placement of
Government contracts for goods and services.
Methods of procurement
Government procurement utilizes two principal
procedures for awarding contracts. The method favored by
Congress is Formal Advertising, which awards either Firm
Fixed-Price Contracts or Fixed-Price Contracts with Escala-
tion Clauses. A variation of Formal Advertising, the Two
U.S., Congress, House, Amendments to the Armed




Rept. 1638 to Accompany H.R. 5532,
87th Cong., 2d Sess.,1962, pp. 1-2.
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Step Method, is designed to obtain the benefits of Formal
Advertising when inadequate specifications are present.
The secondary procurement method is termed
Negotiated. This method is permitted only when the Formal
Advertising method is not feasible and when an exception to
the requirement to Formally Advertise has been granted by
proper authority. The Negotiated procurement method permits
the award of two categories of contracts:
1. Fixed-Price contracts, which consist of the
following types:
a. Firm Fixed-Price contract.
b. Fixed-Price Contract with Escalation.
c. Fixed-Price Incentive Contract.
d. Prospective Price Redetermination.
e. Retroactive Price Redetermination.
2








Formal Advertising method .—Congress desires that
the majority of the Government procurements, regardless of
size and complexity, be contracted for by means of the
Formal Advertising method. This method requires that the
procurement be advertised and that prospective contractors










The Formal Advertising method of procuring goods
and services applies to Government procurements if the
following criteria are present:
1. A complete, accurate and realistic specification
or purchase description must be available.
2. There must be two or more suppliers available,
willing and able to compete effectively for the contract.
3. There must be sufficient time to carry out the
various administrative tasks, i.e., preparation of the
Invitation for Bids (IFB), contractor bid preparation,
publicity period, bid evaluation and, in many instances,
evaluation of bidder responsibility.
zf. The selection of the successful bidder can be
made on the basis of price and other factors, provided the
lowest responsible bidder's response meets the requirements
of the IFB without exception or new conditions.
Negotiated Procurement method . --If the Formal
Advertising criteria are not present in the prospective
procurement the alternate method of obtaining the required
goods or services is then relied upon; namely, negotiated
procurement.
Negotiated procurements, because of the possibility
of restricting competition, are limited to those situations
where all of the following circumstances exist:
A. The use of Negotiation must be authorized by one
of the following seventeen exceptions:
1. National Emergency.
2. Public Exigency.
3- Purchases not in excess of $2,500.
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4. Personal or Professional Services.
5. Services of Educational Institutions.
6. Purchases outside the United States.
7. Medicines or Medical supplies.
8. Property procured for resale.
9. Subsistence Supplies.
10. Absence of competition.
11. Experimental, Developmental or Research Work.
12. Classified Purchase.
13. Standardized or Interchangeable Technical
Equipment.
14-. Technical or Specialized Supplies.
15. Negotiation after Advertising.
16. Purchases for National Defense or Industrial
Mobilization.
17. Otherwise authorized by law.
B. necessary determination and findings have been
made by government personnel;
C. internal agency clearance has been obtained; and
D. the prospective contractors have been determined
to be responsible .
2
In the Negotiated method of procurement the Request for Pro-
posal (RFP) is solicited from the largest number of qualified
sources, consistent with the nature of the requirement, in
order to secure the best "price and other factors" advantage
for the Government.
It is within the framework of the Negotiated method
of procurement that the Truth in Negotiations Act has
evolved. Initially, incentive type contracts were the
object of legislative interest but this gave way to include
all Negotiated type contracts.
Unlimited negotiation
authority
At the outset of the Korean Conflict, President
Truman issued the Korean National Emergency Proclamation.
1 Ibid.
,





The effect of this Proclamation on the ASPR was to invoke
the "National Emergency" exception to the requirement to
Formally Advertise. This expedient for the prosecution of
the armed conflict in Korea was intended to speed the acqui-
sition process. As would be expected, this unhindered power
to negotiate contracts, instead of to formally advertise
for them, was reflected by a dramatic increase in the dollar
value of the Negotiated contracts awarded by DOD.
Congress expressed its fear that the Negotiation of
contracts meant that the Government was not receiving the
lowest possible price by enacting legislation. An amendment
to the Armed Services Procurement Act was passed by Congress
in 1951 which required that Government contracts contain a
clause that would permit the Comptroller General to examine
contractors' records. This access-to-records amendment
marked the beginning of the events that ultimately led to
the passage of the Truth in Negotiations Act.
General Accounting Office
intervention
With pressure from Congress and Comptroller General
Joseph Campbell the audit efforts of GAO were redirected.
Prior to 1955 GAO ' s prime concern was for developing tech-
niques for the internal audit of governmental agencies.
2
Its new interest became in the field of defense contracting.
X U.S. Code 2313(b).
2U.S. v. Hewlett-Packard, Civil Action No. 41881,
N.D. California, February 28, 1966.
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An inordinate amount of Negotiated versus Formally
Advertised contracts continued to be negotiated after cessa-
tion of Korean hostilities. Congress, concerned about the
loss of the competitive atmosphere, directed GAO to utilize
the 1951 access-to-records authority and to delve into
defense contractors' records in order to study the effect of
little or no competition. By 1957? Congress was alarmed by
the number of GAO reported cases of defective pricing data
that had been submitted to Government negotiators. The results
of these GAO audits were submitted to Congress in the form of
Reports to Congress, which became known as "blue books." The
blue-book reports gave publicity to the GAO discoveries and
assisted in the recoupment of excess contractor profits by
way of voluntary refunds. The reports also urged the procure-
ment activities (DOD) to improve their negotiating techniques
and to expand their auditing resources.
Excess profits
The recoupment of excess profit amounts that GAO
audits found to be a result of defective pricing could be
handled in one of three ways. GAO ' s preferred method was to
encourage the procurement agency to seek a voluntary refund.
The Renegotiation Board and the Department of Justice were
the alternate methods and were available to handle aggra-
vated cases of overpricing as well as criminal fraud cases.
To date the Korean National Emergency Proclamation
has not been revoked in total, although the moratorium on
Formal Advertising was terminated in 1957*
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The Renegotiation Board profit position is to take
into consideration a company's profit picture for the entire
year in order to determine if the Government is entitled to
a refund. When a full year of profit is taken into consider-
ation, a company can make a strong case for offsetting
profits with losses and thereby average out a year's profits
with the losses.
The excess profit theory that GAO operated under was
that each contract was a separate agreement with the Govern-
ment. Cost or pricing data were submitted on each
negotiated contract, which determined the costs and the
profit for that particular contract. Therefore, since risk
is assumed on each contract in varying degrees, each contract
must stand on its own outcome and not depend on other con-
tracts to offset over- or under-pricing mistakes.
As far back as 1776 this principle of assumption of
risk on an individual contract had been asserted. The Com-
mittee on Naval Affairs determined in the Kemp Shipbuilding
Case (1776) that:
When the petitioner entered into the contract, he
necessarily took the chances of the rise or fall in
the price of the articles necessary for its completion.
If it (the price) had fallen, the advantage would have
resulted to him, and not to the United States, and if
it had risen, the loss should be his.l
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Review of Defense Procurement Policies, Procedures and
Practices, Part I: Introduction and Truth-in-Negotiations
(P.L. 87-6^3 ), Hearings before a subcommittee for Special
Investigations , House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st
sess. , 1967, p. 1.
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The voluntary contractor repayment of excess profits
was not a wholly reliable method of recoupment of unearned
profits for the Government. There was the possibility that
contractors would average out the losses with the profits,
contrary to GAO's position that each contract should stand
alone. The contractors could also determine for themselves
what percentage of their profits were excess. Neither of
these alternatives was satisfactory. As a result, Congress
and GAO were becoming increasingly uneasy about the mounting
defense costs and about the reports of excessive profits.
The Legislative History
of Public haw 87-653
The legislative history of the Truth in Negotiations
Act spans the period from I960 to 1962. The preliminary
factors which led to the Act began in 1958 and changes have
been initiated and enacted as recently as 1968. A chronology
of the events surrounding the Act has been compiled to
assist the reader in following the sequence.
Chronology of Truth in Negotiations
194-7 - Armed Services Procurement Act passed by
Congress.
1951 - Act amended granting GAO access to contractor
records (10 U.S. Code 2$13[b]).
1955 - GAO shift of audit emphasis from internal Govern-
ment auditing to the area of defense contract
audits.
1957 - Korean National Emergency Proclamation moratorium
on Formal Advertising revoked.
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1958 - U.S. Air Force instituted a requirement for con-
tractor certification of cost data submitted in
response to Request for Proposals.
1959 - ASPR revised to coincide with Air Force certifica-
tion requirement.
1959 - Renegotiation Act extended three years. Congress
directed House and Senate Armed Services Committees
to study military procurement methods, policies
and practices in conjunction with the extension of
the Renegotiation Board.
1960 - H.R. 12299—Representative Vinson's first proposal
to amend the Armed Services Procurement Act by
restricting incentive contracting. Bill rewritten.
I960 - H.R. 12572--the revised H.R. 12299--required complete,
accurate, and timely cost information. Passed House
on June 24 and sent to the Senate Armed Services
Committee. Tabled.
1960 - Senate Armed Services Committee Procurement Hearings
made nine recommendations to DOD to improve con-
tracting. No legislation offered.
1961 - H.R. 5532 (H.R. 12572 reissued)—Representative
Hebert ' s reintroduction of the bill to control
incentive contracting.
1962 - H.R. 5532--reported out of the House Armed Services
Committee and passed by House in June 1962 by vote
of 562 to 0. Sent to the Senate.
1962 - Senate received H.R. 5552, Truth in Negotiations
Act. July 50 to August 6, H.R. 5532 Revised
—
Section "g" revised to section "e" and instead of
controlling incentive contracting only, covered all
classes of negotiated contracts. Required contractor
data certification and contract price reduction for
defective data.
1962 - August 23. —H.R. 5552 passed Senate, without debate.
1962 - August 28.—H.R. 5532 passed House of Representatives.
1962 - September 10.--H.R. 5552 became law and amended
Armed Services Procurement Act of 19^7? Chapter 137,
Title 10, United States Code 2306(f). Public
Law 87-653—Truth in Negotiations Act.
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1962 - December 1.—Effective date of Truth in Negoti-
ations Act. ASPR revised, and Act became effective.
1963 - August.—H.R. 7909—Representative Hebert proposed
amendments to revise H.R. 5532 and to weaken it.
Defeated.
1967 - November. --D0D administratively revised ASPR to
permit postaward contract audits.
1968 - March. --H.R. 10573 and H.R. 13100 introduced by
Representatives Minshall and Vhalen respectively.
Proposed to amend PL 87-653 to require postaward
audit of contracts.
1968 - May 6.--H.R. 10573 passed House (H.R. 13100 with-
drawn )
.
1968 - September 11.—H.R. 10573 passed Senate.
1968 - September 28.—Effective date of H.R. 10573 amend-
ment to Truth in Negotiations Act.
By 1958 a sensitive Air Force had developed a proce-
dure for the certification of contractor submitted cost data.
This first step toward truth in negotiation of contracts was
heralded by GAO. GAO, not completely satisfied, called on
the Air Force to go a step further to strengthen its controls
on contract pricing. This was to be accomplished by examin-
ing contractor records to ensure that the proposals were
reasonable, and that the cost data were current, complete,
and accurate.
From 1958 to I960, GAO probing and numerous blue-book
reports to Congress on the insufficiency of cost data from
contractors prompted a summary report on Air Force contracting.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Weapons System Management
,
Hearings before a subcommittee for
Special Investigations, House of Reoresentatives , on H.R.
5532, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 361.
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The report that was presented to Congress by Lawrence J.
Powers, Director of Defense Accounting and Auditing
Division of GAO, stated:
The buyer's lack of knowledge and adequate considera-
tion of the latest cost data available to the vendor
in establishing prices is the most important weakness
observed in the cases covered by this report.
1
ASPR revised
The ASPR provided an administrative remedy to GAO
demands for profit control when it was revised in October
1959* A cost or pricing data accuracy certification was
required for cost or pricing data submitted by prime con-
tractors when a negotiated procurement was expected to
exceed $100,000, when (1) the proposed price was an estimate
rather than the result of competition, or (2) there was not
an established catalog or market price or price set by law.
This ASPR requirement did not provide for any reduction in
price if defective data were submitted.
Momentum was now building in Congress for the enact-
ment of some legislation to govern contract negotiations.
This momentum was the result of the GAO blue-book reports,
Congressional hearings, and apparently unsuccessful adminis-
trative procedures for the control of excessive profit.
Renegotiation Board
At this same point in time another factor appeared






Negotiations Act; namely, the deadline for the lapse or
extension, no later than June 30, 1959, of the Renegotiation
Act of 1951. The Renegotiation Act is based on the prin-
ciple of flexible renegotiation of Government contract
profits without formula or percentage to determine what is
excessive. After certain allowable costs, excess profits
determination is based on capital employed, character of
business, defense effort contribution, assumed risk, effi-
ciency of operation, and reasonableness of costs and
2profit. This determination by the Renegotiation Board
encompasses the profits received from Government contracts
and subcontracts for the fiscal year and permits the
carryover of a loss for five years.
The House Ways and Means Committee presented the
House with a bill to extend the Renegotiation Act for four
years. There was an amendment in the bill to give special
consideration to the risk-incentive situation that is
present in incentive contracts which involve not only the
opportunity for higher profits as do Cost-Pius contracts,
but also the possibility of lower profits or even a loss.
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1968 Government
Contracts Guide (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
1968 J, par. 502.
2ASPR, par. 1-319.
5U.S., Congress, House, Representative Wilber D.
Mills speaking for the Renegotiation Act extension, H.R.






Renewal of the Renegotiation Act did not seem in
Jeopardy until this effort was made to exclude incentive-
type contracts from the purview of the Renegotiation Board.
It was the position of industry in this matter that incen-
tive contracting, a legal form of Government contracting,
was intended to reduce costs and reward the efficient
contractor by increasing his profits. Industry also felt
that increased efficiency and thereby profits were in danger
of being drained off through renegotiation.
Congressman Carl Vinson, long an opponent of incen-
tive contracting, which he felt provided an opportunity for
excess profit, and author of various profit control bills
over the years, stepped into the contest. The House passed
the extension bill in spite of Mr. Vinson's objection to the
special consideration given to incentive contracts. The
bill was sent to the Senate where Mr. Vinson personally
appeared as a witness before the Senate Finance Committee in
an attempt to eliminate any special consideration for incen-
tive contracts. A Senate bill was substituted for the House
bill and extended the Renegotiation Act for three years.
The Senate bill also called for the Joint Committees on
Internal Revenue Taxation to study the subject of renegoti-
ation. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees were
instructed to report the findings of their investigation
Vinson - Trammel Act, 1934; Smith - Vinson Act,
19^2; and H.R. 9246, H.R. 9564 during the 81st Cong., 2d
sess., which led to the Renegotiation Act of 1951-
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to their respective Houses by September 30, I960.
In order to study fully the renegotiation subject
the Committees were directed to study military procurement
methods, policies, and practices and to consider the effec-
tiveness of contractual instruments in achieving reasonable
costs, prices, and profits in defense procurement. The
study was stated not to be an indictment of all defense
contractors or Government contracting officers.
It appeared in the early stages of the investigation
that there was an inequity in negotiations, that Government
was not on the same knowledge level as industry where the
matter of current costs and pricing data was concerned. GAO
blue-book reports indicated that the primary cause of the
inequity and the resultant overpricing of contracts was the
contractor's failure to provide accurate, current or complete
cost data. It was contended by GAO that the Government's
negotiator would be in a better position to establish an
2equitable price if contractor cost data were made available.
Legislative Hearings
House action
In the House of Representatives a Special Subcom-
mittee on Procurement Practices, chaired by Mr. Vinson, set
House, Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 194-7
,
Rept. 1638, p. 3.
2Herbert Roback, "Truth in Negotiating: The Legis-
lative Background of P.L. 87-653," Speech presented to the
American Bar Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 8, 1967,
Public Contract Law Journal
,
I, No. 2 (July, 1968), 10.'
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about to perform the required procurement study. Mr. Vinson
focused on incentive contracting as the culprit for
encouraging excess profits. It was his contention that if
a contractor overestimates his costs, then his cost estimate,
as an element in determining target cost and ultimately
target profit, is increased. The thrust of Chairman Vinson
and former Comptroller General Campell ' s proposals to the
Committee were to limit incentive profit to those cases
where the contractor could prove that his efforts resulted
in savings to the Government. This would reward efficient
contractors and eliminate windfall profits. In order to
accomplish this type of control on incentive contracting it
would be essential that the contractor supply reasonable
proposals and strong justification to support his proposals.
For a Government negotiator to justify the contractors'
proposals would require access to the contractors' working
papers or an audit of pertinent records. This was not a
new theme, but Mr. Vinson was determined to make an issue
of the incentive contracting profit loophole and carry the
issue to the statutory stage.
Proposed legislation .— In May of I960, Mr. Vinson
requested J. Edward Welch from the GAO Office of General
Counsel and the subcommittee Special Counsel, John J.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings Pursuant to Section 4-, Public haw 86-89
,
before a
Special Subcommittee on Procurement Practices of Department
of Defense, House of Representatives, Appendix 4: Considera-
tions of H.R. 12299, 86th Cong., 2d sess., I960, pp. l^b-4-1.

Courtney, to draft legislation that would control incentive
contracting. These gentlemen and the House Special Subcom-
mittee produced H.R. 12299, which proposed several amend-
ments to the ASPR. One of the amendments in particular was
aimed at incentive contracting and stated that contracts
would carry a clause that would require that the contractor
prove he was responsible for any reduction in costs which
would increase his profit.
The DOD presented arguments against the proposed
amendment saying that it was impractical and that the admin-
istration of the proposal would be burdensome. The most
telling arguments presented by DOD Counsel James P. Nash
were that the legislation would require DOD to retreat to
Cost-Pius contracting and that the language of H.R. 12299
might be construed as prohibiting Firm-Fixed-Price con-
2tracts. It was further argued that the ASPR revisions
implemented in 1959 were sufficient since they were initi-
ated by GAO. The ASPR regulations then in effect did not
permit the award of a negotiated contract without prior
written or oral discussion unless (1) all offerers were
warned to quote their best price initially, (2) very sub-
stantial competition existed, or (3) extensive prior








5ASPR, par. 3-805(b) (1958)
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required contractors of contracts over $100,000 to certify
that all available cost or pricing data were considered in
preparing the price estimate and that the data were made
known to the contracting officer.
Congressman William H. Bates expressed the opinion
of a number of the opponents to H.R. 12299 when he remarked
that the subcommittee was attempting to legislate judgment,
a factor that cannot be legislated. With the skepticism of
subcommittee members evident, Mr. Vinson ordered a revision
of the amendment
.
First revision . --GAP rewrote the original bill with
assistance from DOD; the result was presented to Mr. Vinson
as H.R. 12572. While still concentrating on incentive
contracting, the new bill carried for the first time the
language—the requirement— for complete, accurate, and
timely cost information. Also introduced for the first
time was the price reduction requirement to be utilized if,
upon audit, defective data were found to have been submitted
by the contractor.
H.R. 12572 met with success and was passed by the
House of Representatives on June 24-, I960, to the personal
pleasure of Mr. Vinson. Representative Bates, in endorsing
the bill on the floor of the House, will probably be
remembered for his expression of confidence that the





enactment of H.R. 12572 would eliminate most of the kinds
of overpricing that GAO audits uncovered.
Senate action
The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee was in the
midst of its own defense procurement hearing when H.R. 12572
was sent from the House--it was pigeonholed. The Armed
Services Procurement Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Strom
Thurmond, had heard much the same testimony as their
counterparts in the House. There was a difference in the
reception the testimony received, especially that of DOD,
who advised the subcommittee of the ASPR regulation
presently in effect to preclude such occurrences as
H.R. 12572 was designed to eliminate. The GAO testified
that they were not yet able to evaluate the effectiveness
of the DOD referenced ASPR regulations, which they themselves
2had sponsored.
Chairman Thurmond directed DOD and GAO to develop
a more suitable procurement law amendment which followed
the cost certification aspect of H.R. 12572, but he also
desired that incentive profits which were unrelated to the-
contractor's efforts be prohibited. The GAO responded by
U.S., Congress, House, Representative Bates
speaking for Amendments to Armed Services Procurement Act




2U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Amendments to Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Hear-




reviving part of the House rejected H.R. 12299, which re-
quired contractors to prove that their efforts resulted in
lower contract costs and thereby entitled them to the
incentive profits. Contractor cost certification was also
a requirement of the revised bill, thereby imposing two kinds
of statutory obligations on contractors and placing the
burden of proof on them and not on the Government.
In the later stages of the legislative session the
calmer Senate procurement subcommittee credited DOD with a
sincere effort to improve its procurement methods. They
also desired to allow GAO time to evaluate the 1959 COD
administrative changes to ASPR. This attitude was in keeping
with the subcommittee report, one week prior to adjournment,
that it was their conclusion that the procurement problems
of DOD could be solved by administrative procedures.
Administrative versus statutory changes .--The Senate
Armed Services Committee "Report on Procurement" to the
Senate on August 23, i960, made nine recommendations to DOD
for the administrative improvement of procurement practices.
One recommendation is worthy of note in that it recom-
mended a contractual provision to permit the adjustment
of the target cost to exclude any amount by which the
target cost was increased due to contractor submitted
inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent cost data. This
U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee,
Report on Procurement
,
S. Rept. 1900, 86th Cong., 2d sess.,
I960, pp. 26, 28.

28
recommendation for a price adjustment to incentive contract
provisions was thought to be the answer to Representative
Vinson's legislative proposal as well as a method of closing
the loophole in existing regulations. The DOD took this
Senate recommendation one step further and instead of adding
a price reduction clause to incentive contracts only, added
it to all types of negotiated contracts.
Final submission
Commencing with the Eighty-seventh Congress in 1961,
Representative F. Edward Hebert became Chairman of the House
Subcommittee for Special Investigations, relieving Mr. Vinson.
As the first order of business Mr. Hebert reintroduced the
Vinson bill, H.R. 12572, as H.R. 5532, which was quickly
passed by the Pious e Special Investigations subcommittee
without waiting either for formal comments that had been
solicited from GAO and DOD or for witnesses. The House
Armed Services Committee did not act on PI.R. 5532 because of
Mr. Vinson's belief that the bill would not pass the Senate.
H.R. 5532 comments . --In April of 1961, the DOD
General Counsel, Cyrus R. Vance, submitted comments opposing
H.R. 5532. The thrust of the DOD objections were that a.
law would be inflexible, whereas regulations could more easily
keep up with changing procurement situations. H.R. 5532
singled out incentive contracting for special treatment while
House , Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 194-7
,
Rept. 1658, pp. 7-12.
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the DOD regulations were not thus limited. The final objec-
tion was that the ASPR went beyond H.R. 5532 and required
profit reductions for defective pricing as recommended by
the Senate at the end of the previous legislative session.
GAO ' s comments were the same as those presented to
the subcommittee chaired by Senator Thurmond the previous
year. The ASPR was recognized as having several of
H.R. 5532 ' s provisions but GAO stressed that administrative
regulations, which are changeable, were not a substitute
for law.
The House Armed Services Committee finally reported
out H.R. 5532 in April 1962, a year after it was first intro-
duced. In the report accompanying H.R. 5532 DOD acquiescence
and GAO support for the bill were stated, although DOD had
commented earlier that "the Department is opposed to enacting
this provision into law."
The House Armed Services Committee opposition to
H.R. 5532 was strong enough to result in the issuance of a
minority report. The Committee's unprecedented minority
report was issued supporting the DOD approach of adminis-
tratively controlling procurement through the Secretary of
2Defense and the ASPR instead of by statute.
House, Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 194-7
,
Rept. 1638, p. 10.
2U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee,
Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7 ?
Rept. 1638, Pt . 2" (Minority Report) to Accompany H.R. 5532,
87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 4-„
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The House passes H.R. 5552 .—The House bill
H.R. 5532 passed the House on June 7, 1962, by a vote of
362 to 0, but not without a memorable statement by Repre-
sentative H. Allen Smith. Representative Smith was speaking
about the section of the bill pertaining to downward price
adjustments when defective pricing was discovered but that
increases were not permitted:
It has the effect of requiring that a contractor's
foresight must be as precisely accurate as an auditor's
hindsight, a state of perfection not attainable this
side of transmigation to a higher state of heavenly
existence .
1
It was Mr. Smith's view that fair dealing should permit
profit increases as well as decreases.
In defense of the bill, Mr. Hebert , the sponsor,
revealed new G-AO figures that showed that the ASPR require-
ment for obtaining certificates of cost or pricing data for
negotiation were not obtained by the Army or Navy in 121 of
2276 cases reviewed between January I960 and June 1962. The
Air Force had learned its lessons well because in 88 cases
5that GAO reviewed there was 100 percent ASPR conformance.
U.S., Congress, House, Representative H. Allen
Smith, speaking against the Amendment to the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 194-7, H.R. 5532, 87th Cong., 2d seas., 1
June 7, 1962, Congressional Record , CVIII, 9968.
2U.S., General Accounting Office, Review of Extent
to Which Military Procurement Agencies and Prime Contractors
Have Obtained Certifications as to the Accuracy and Com-
pleteness of Cost Data Used in Negotiation of Contract
Prices, Report to Congress, B-125050, October 4, 1960




To Mr. Vinson's thinking this GAO report reinforced his con-
tention that incentive contracting rewarded deceptive
negotiating or superior guesses rather than demonstratable
superior performance. It also proved that legislation was
required and that administrative regulations were ineffec-
tive because the Armed Services were not adhering to their
own ASPR regulations.
The Senate and H.R. 5532 .—
^
r * Vinson followed
H.R. 5532 to the Senate to preach its merits and to do all
in his power to ensure the enactment of the amendment. The
section of H.R. 5532 that was of special interest to
Mr. Vinson was the section that dealt with full disclosure
in negotiations and target price readjustment in incentive
contracts. In order to see this section through into law
Mr. Vinson was willing to sacrifice the rest of the bill.
He felt that "if it is a good regulation, it will be a good
law." 1
Committee testimony . --DOD continued its opposition
to H.R. 5532 principally because it was felt that the bill
would eliminate incentive type contracting as a procurement
tool. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics) Thomas D. Morris argued that the ASPR regulations
were now being enforced and that the ASPR went beyond the
proposals contained in H.R. 5532. He further advocated the
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7
,





enactment of the ASPR regulations if the committee continued
to feel that a statute was necessary.
GAO was placed in the enviable position of being able
to draw support from both DOD and Mr. Vinson. GAO blue-book
reports asserted that the failure of the Army and Navy to
obtain contractor certifications may have resulted in higher
contract costs and probably weakened Government profit
recovery chances. For this reason GAO and Congress felt that
a statute was needed. Since some statute was to be enacted
GAO sided with DOD in its reasoning that the legislation
should cover all negotiated contracts and not single out
incentive contracts.
Mr. Vinson, in his testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, was reluctant to abandon his position
that incentive contracts were the culprit that cost the
Government additional millions of dollars. Pie was of the
belief that H.R. 5532 would close the incentive contracting
loopholes and that broader coverage was not needed.
Mr. Vinson felt that DOD and GAO were going too far with
2their recommendations for broader coverage.
Chairman Russell, of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, finally convinced Mr. Vinson that the price for the
enactment of legislation to control incentive contracting
would be the broader Senate coverage of all contracting or









any legislation that just applies to these incentive con-
tracts and drive everybody out of the incentive field to
cost plus where we will really get rooked." The Senate
desire for legislation was a direct result of the GAO blue-
book reports of DOD noncompliance with the existing ASPR
regulations.
Comparison of the two H.R. 3332 's .—During the
period July 30 to August 6, 1962, representatives of DOD
and GAO drafted a revised H.R. 5532 for the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Section "g" of the House version of
the bill was revised to become section "e" of the new Senate
version. The House bill (section "g") applied to incentive
contracts only and required:
1. That contractor certified cost and pricing data
be accurate, complete, and current.
2. That the data be submitted in negotiation.
3. That an audit will be made prior to the applica-
tion of the profit-sharing formula to determine
whether the costs used in negotiation were
accurate, complete, and current.
4. That if the figures were not accurate, complete,
and current, the target price be reduced to the
extent that the figures were not accurate.
5. That only after the audit and reduction of the
target price, if required, would the profit formula
be applied.
2
The revised Senate version of the bill (see Appen-




2U.S., Congress, House, Representative Vinson,
speaking on the Amendment to the Armed Services Procurement






of GAO and DOD. In its final form the Amendment to the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 :
1. Applied to all negotiated contracts.
2. Required contractor certificates of accurate,
complete, and current cost or pricing data on
all contracts or subcontracts over $100,000.
3. Permitted price adjustment if the price was
increased by defective cost or pricing data.
4. Permitted exceptions to the certification
requitement
.
5. Did not include the audit requirement, proposed
by the House, prior to profit formula determina-
tion. 1
The Congressional attitude .— The views of the
Senators and Representatives toward H.R. 5532, as a method
of bringing truth to the negotiation table were, in general,
simplistic. Mr. Hebert stated:
Truth works v/onders. All this section [sec."g"]
requires is that the truth be made known at the time
of bargaining. Who can object to telling the truth?
The argument about persons being penalized for what
they do not know is plain nonsense. The truth is
nothing more or less than what a contractor knows
when he opens his mouth. What he does not know, he
does not speak.
2
It was Mr. Vinson's view that if all facts known to the
contractor were disclosed at negotiation and nothing was
hidden there would be no problem and the contractor would
receive his incentive profit. Senator Symington perceived
the issue to be "efficiency and intelligence" instead of
U.S., Congress, House, Passage of Amendment to
Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7, H.R. 5532, Truth
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"integrity" and observed that a contractor who erred
whether it be by design or by neglect would not be re-
warded. The principal point here is that if a contractor
makes an honest error in calculating his cost or pricing
data and he thereby inflates his costs, he does not lose
anything by a price reduction, but merely gives back to the
Government its due.
The GAP attitude . --GAP concurred in the interpre-
tation and purpose of the bill that Senator Symington had
set forth. GAG had long advocated that legislation and not
administrative regulation was required because regulations
change too rapidly and are not easily enforced. In the
matter of price reductions, GAO policy concerning each
contract standing on its own merits acted as a safeguard
against a contractor "buying in" with low bids in order to
obtain follow-on contracts with which to profit. This
principle also prevented the Government from assuming risk
that the contractor was being paid to accept.
With the right of price reduction a new question
arose concerning the balancing out of individual items of
cost or pricing data. The right to "offset" underpricing
with overpricing was held by GAO to be not allowed. The
argument advanced by GAO was that the contractor was in a
position of superior knowledge; it was data that he had







a position to insure him against his own mistakes. The
final argument presented was that for every error the
Government found the contractor could find many more because
the contractor had more time and personnel with a more
intimate knowledge of the contract.
The industry attitude .— Industry was not particu-
larly favorable toward, the amendments proposed by either of
the H.R. 5532' s. The principal question that industry had
was that the term "data" was not defined and that they could
not distinguish between actual and estimated costs. There
was also a fear that innocent mistakes would be penalized
and that offsets would not be permitted.
In general, the industry position was that the pro-
posed amendment would discourage incentive contracting, would
subject innocent offenders to possible criminal prosecution,
would demand a "perfection of data impossible to achieve,"
was completely one-sided and unfair, would subject the con-
tractors to risks of indefinite duration for downward price
revisions, and, similarly, would put a lingering statutory
cloud on their accounting statements.
Senate passes H.R. 5532 .—On August 23, 1962, without
pdebate, H.R. 5532 passed the Senate. Five days later, on




2U.S. Congress, Senate, Passage of Amendment to
Armed Services Procurement Act of 194-7, H.R. 5532, Truth








September 10, 1962. Between the passing of the law and its
effective date, December 1, 1962, DOD revised the ASPR to
reflect the requirements of this Truth in Negotiations Act.
Since 1962 all other Government agencies have become subject
to the Law.
Revisions to the Act
First attempt
After the Truth in Negotiations Act had been law for
eight months, Representative Hebert, the author of H.R. 5532,
introduced H.R. 7909 with four proposed changes to the Act.
Mr. Hebert ' s amendments would (1) ensure that pricing data
certificates would not be required on contracts less than
$100,000, (2) permit offsets of over- and underpricing due
to inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent cost data in order
to balance out price adjustments but not to increase the
total price, (3) authorize contract price adjustment only
if the contractor had knowledge of the deceptive data that
were certified, and (4-) prohibit , rather than leave discre-
tionary, the use of certificates when the negotiated price
is based on competition, established catalog or market
2price.








Both GAO and DOD were opposed to all of Mr. Hebert '
s
proposals. Specifically, the arguments against H.R. 7909
were
:
1. $100,000 floor.—Proposed $100,000 floor on certifi-
cation requests stressed that:
a. Nothing in legislative history showed Congres-
sional intent to prevent administrative
requirements on lesser amounts.
b. A statutory prohibition would seriously affect
the negotiation of reasonable prices.
c. Overpricing of many small contracts is Just
as costly as overpricing a few contracts over
$100,000.
2* Offsets .— This amendment was dismissed as not being
in the best interest of the Government because:
a. It would place the Government in the role of
insurer of the contractor who submitted the
low bid, especially if the contractor knew
it was low.
b. It would encourage buying-in.
c. It would not penalize the contractor if the
certified cost or pricing data are inaccurate,
incomplete or noncurrent since the Government
recovers only the overcharge.
3. Honest mistake.—The proposal to recognize the
honest mistake as against the dishonest mistake can be
argued with the same responses used against offsets. Addi-
tionally, it can be pointed out that the price adjustment
(downward) is not punitive and the findings are not of
contractor guilt, but, rather, of fault in the data sub-
mitted. The mistakes are corrected by the price adjustment




A dishonest mistake can be handled by criminal and civil
fraud statutes. The purpose of the Truth in Negotiations
Act was to control defective pricing data where the con-
tractor had the responsibility for submitting correct data.
If the Government had to prove whether a mistake was
"honest" or "dishonest," the requirement would effectively
nullify the law.
4-. Mandatory certificate exemption .—GAO and DOD
desired to retain the administrative flexibility of the
existing lav/. It was felt that in special situations even
though the price was based on competition or established
catalog or market price there might be a need to request
cost or pricing data certifications to protect the
Government
.
Mr. Hebert ' s proposed amendment to the Armed
Services Procurement Act was defeated.
The Law is amended
DOD, in November of 1967,. issued Defense Procure-
ment Circular (DPC) number 57 "bo administratively revise
certain sections of the ASPR. One of the revisions was the
insertion, in noncompetetive fixed-price and cost type
contracts, of a clause to permit the postaward audit of
Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States, "The Truth in Negotiations Act in Perspective,"
The Truth in Negotiations Act ... A MAPI Symposium (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Machinery and Allied Products Institute and
Council for Technological Advancement, 1969), p. 8.
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contractor data upon which reliance was placed for the
proposal submission.
In March 1968, the House Special Investigations Sub-
committee opened hearings on two identical bills--H.R. 10573
and H.R. 13100--introduced by Representatives Minshall and
2Vhalen respectively, on the subject of postaward audits.
It was Mr. Minshall ' s intention to save "billions of defense
dollars" by the enactment of his bill "that would guarantee
a full-fledged post audit, by the Department of Defense, of
all financial records of defense contractors and subcon-
tractors to determine whether the Government is being
overcharged." Mr. Minshall remarked that DOD had issued
auditing procedures "much in line with the intent" of his
bill but that his long experience in dealing with the
military had warned him that such regulations are "subject
to change, misinterpretation or oversight." Both GAO and
DOD acknowledged the need for postaward audits although DOD
U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Procurement
Circular Number 57 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 4, 6.
2U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee,
Truth in Negotiations (H.R. 10575) , Hearings before a Subcom-
mittee for Special Investigations, House of Representatives,
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would have been content with the Defense Procurement
Circular 57 administrative implementation rather than an
amendment to Public Law 87-653."
Mr. Minshall's H.R. 10573 (see Appendix B) was
favorably reported out of Committee without amendment by
both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House
Special Investigations Subcommittee. H.R. 10573 passed the
House on May 6, 1968, and the Senate on September 11, 1968;
it was approved on September 25, 1968.
ASPR changes
The administrative regulations implementing the
Truth in Negotiations Act have not been as free from change
as the Public Lav/ itself. The ASPR and the other Govern-
mental regulations that spell out procurement policy have
been changed to keep pace with Board of Contract Appeals
decisions and GAO interpretations. The decisions and their
effects will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
Summary
The Truth in Negotiations Act was the result of
four years of legislative hearings, three proposed bills,
numerous GAO blue-book reports, and hours of DOD, GAO, and
industry testimony. What Representative Carl Vinson
initiated as a means of controlling incentive contracting
ended as legislation to control all Negotiated type






The enacted Truth in Negotiations Act was acceptable
to "both GAO and DOD even though the former had fully sup-
ported the "incentive contract only" approach of Mr. Vinson.
Congress appeared content with the legislation, and
Mr. Vinson was i^econciled to the broader coverage afforded
by the revised H.R. 5532.
Opposition to the Truth in Negotiations Act has
been centered principally on two points which have been
discussed: (1) the "honest" mistake of the contractor in
his certified cost or pricing data, and (2) offsets of over
and underpricing to balance out price adjustments. Confusion
has also arisen because of the GAO interpretation of the
intent of the Act, especially on the latter point.
The advocates of PL 87-655 point out the legal
concept upon which the lav/ is based:
That it is unjust to allow one who has made a mis-
representation, even innocently, to retain the fruits
of a bargain induced by such representation. -*-
GAO believes that the Act provides a practical solu-
tion to the Government's problem of how to obtain fair
prices where the normal economic market forces do not
2prevail. This view of the Act is not held by industry,
as stated by a spokesman for industry, the Senior Vice
1Robert F. Keller, "The Role of the General
Accounting Office in the Enactment and Implementation of
Public Law 87-655—The Truth in Negotiations Act," The
Federal Accountant
,





President of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute
"
. . .
the Truth in Negotiations Law is bad lav/, poor
economics, and unsound procurement policy."
Charles I. Derr, Senior Vice President of Machinery
and Allied Products Institute, "An Industry Viev/ of the
Truth in Negotiations Act," The Truth in Negotiations Act
..A MAPI Symposium (Washington, D. C. : Machinery and
Allied Products Institute and Council for Technological





The purpose of Chapter III is to discuss the various
ASPE provisions implementing PL 87-653 as well as the impor-
tant Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals decisions
interpreting the Public Law. Government and industry imple-
menting problems and a review of terms of the art that
surround the Act will be presented along with a review of
the steps being taken to improve implementation. The various
publications utilized by Government and industry to implement,
instruct, and maintain proficiency in the area of Government
contracting will begin the presentation.
Unlike most laws passed by Congress, which are
quietly administered after an initial breaking- in period,
the Truth in Negotiations Act has been a source of continuous
conflict. The basic idea of the Act is simple: the Govern-
ment wants to know what the contractor knows or should know
about the proposed costs. With an exchange of cost or
pricing data knowledge both parties should be on an equal
footing in the negotiation of a fair and equitable contract
when competition or a market place is not available to set




the Act are still uncertain and undefined after six years.
Gilbert Cuneo, a government contract lawyer of renown,
contends that many of industry's problems stem from the
constantly changing implementation regulations of the Act
as set forth in the ASPR.
Procurement Regulations
Government publications
Although the Truth in Negotiations Act was initiated
principally for the control of DOD and its defense contracts,
the Act has subsequently been incorporated into the regula-
tions of all other governmental agencies. The DOD contract-
ing regulation, ASPR, promulgates the procurement policies
and procedures established by the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 194-7 a-n(3- its amendments. The ASPR is issued, at the
direction of the Secretary of Defense, by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) with the
2
advice and recommendations of the ASPR Committee.
Between published changes to the ASPR, revisions
are issued in the form of Defense Procurement Circulars (DPC)
Gilbert A. Cuneo, "The Practical Impact of Public
Lav; 87-653 (Truth in Negotiations Act) on Primes and Sub-




2The ASPR Committee is composed of ten members;
two from each service's Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L),
an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Procurement) from each
service, and the Director of the Defense Supply Agency.
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v/hich remain in effect until incorporated into the manual.
Additionally, policies, procedures, and general information
are promulgated by DOD Directives, Instructions, and Manuals.
The ASPR is designed to achieve maximum uniformity
throughout DOD as to policies and procedures covering the
procurement of supplies and services. The ASPR is presently
being implemented by:
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy





In an attempt to keep abreast of the ASPR and its
changes, there have been instituted several commercial publi-
cations. The publications are in the form of trade associ-
ation memorandums, bulletins, and books. Two prominent trade
associations are:
1. Machinery and Allied Products Institute (MAPI)
and Council for Technological Advancement.
2. Aerospace Industries Association.
Other organizations, such as the Bureau of National Affairs
(Federal Contract Report ), Federal Publications, Inc. ( The '
Government Contractor, Communique and Briefing Papers ) , and
Commerce Clearing House ( Government Contracts Guide and
Government Contract Reports ), publish well-knovm organs that
report on the Washington procurement scene and provide
studies and comments on current events affecting Government




procurement and contracting. The American Bar Association's
Public Contract Law Section, the Federal Government Accoun-
tants Association, and the National Contracts Management
Association are professional organizations that are also in-
volved with Government contracting and publish journals on
the subject.
Interpretation of the haw
Competitive process
The terms "adequate price competition" and "estab-
lished catalog or market price of commercial items sold in
substantial quantities to the general public" are terms of
2the art which have been precisely defined in ASPR. They
constitute exceptions to the general requirement for the
contractor's submission of cost or pricing data, as required
by PL 87-653? in negotiated procurements. If the following
criteria exist, then competition exists and an adequate
price based on this competition exists:
. . .
if offers are solicited and (i) at least two
responsible offerors (ii) who can satisfy the pur-
chasers (e.g., the Government's) requirements (iii)
independently contend for a contract to be awarded
to the responsive and responsible offeror submitting
the lowest evaluated price (iv) by submitting priced
offers responsive to the expressed requirements of
the solicitation. Whether there is price competition
for a given procurement is a matter of judgement to
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1231 25th
Street, N.W. , Washington, D.C. 20037; and The Government






be based on evaluation of whether each of the foregoing
conditions (i) through (iv) is satisfied. ... .1
Where competition is possible, price becomes the main
consideration. Contracting officers rely on competition to
establish the reasonableness of prices and then make awards
to the lowest responsible bidder. Purchasing in a competi-
tive market is not always possible. For example, during
fiscal year 1968 the Navy Department experienced 3.7 million
procurement actions, 99.7 percent of which were less than
$100,000. The other .3 percent of the procurement actions
accounted for 83 percent of the total procurement dollar-
expenditures. Dollarwise, 35-7 percent of Navy's
$12,736,931,000 were competitive buys and 64.3 percent non-
competitive (45.8 percent of the total expenditures were on
one-source solicitations). In these cases, reasonableness
must be evaluated by means of either price analysis or cost
analysis techniques.
When there is adequate price competition, cost or
pricing data shall not be requested from the offeror regard-
less of the dollar amount involved. As a general rule, cost
or pricing data should not be requested when it has been
determined that proposed "prices are" or are "based on"
established catalog or market prices of commercial items sold
1 Ibid
.
2U.S., Department of the Navy, Headquarters Naval
Material Command, Survey of Procurement Statistics (NAVMAT
P-4200), June, 1968, pp. 10, 26.
5ASPE, par. 3-807. 3(c).
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in substantial quantities to the general public. The exis-
tence of a catalog in itself is not sufficient; nor is the
fact that an item is called "commercial" an indication that
the price is reasonable. Quantity purchased, monopoly, and
monopsony can influence the reasonableness of a price.
It is essential that contracting officers utilize
some form of evaluation of contractor submitted prices in
order to ensure price reasonableness. The method of analysis
and the depth to which it is utilized depend upon the antici-
pated cost of the contract, the competitive situation, the
2
"should cost," and the price source.
Price analysis
Price analysis is defined by ASPR as the process of
examining and evaluating a prospective price without the
evaluation of the separate cost elements and profit of the
individual prospective supplier whose price is being evalu-
ated. This type of analysis is the least expensive m terms
of time and money for both the Government and the bidder
alike. Price analysis may be performed in various ways
:
1. Price quotation comparison.
2. Prior quotation comparison.
3. Use of a rough yardstick (i.e., dollars per pound
or dollars per horsepower).
4-. Comparison of proposed price with independently
developed cost estimates.^"
1 Ibid.
pReasonable expectation from past experience, inspec-
tion and common sense as to what the item "should cost" as
against the current price charged.
N
3ASPR, par. 3-807.2. 4Ibid.

50
If this analysis does not substantiate the bidder ' s quote,
or the quote is deemed unreasonable, then cost analysis is
required.
Cost analysis
Cost analysis, as distinguished from price analysis,
is the process of projecting the effect of cost breakdown
data (cost or pricing data) secured from the contractor or
subcontractor in order to determine its effect on the quoted
price. To be considered in this analysis are the effects of
such cost factors as:
1. The necessity for certain costs.
2. Reasonableness of amounts.
3. Basis for allocation of overhead costs.
4. Appropriateness of the allocations of particular
overhead costs to the proposed contract.
^
Cost or pricing data
Public Law 87-653 stipulates that Government con-
tracting officers "shall require the contractor to submit
in writing cost or pricing data and to certify, by use of
the certificate set forth in ASPR 3-807.4 [see Appendix C]
,
that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or
pricing data he submitted was accurate, complete and
p
current . . . . " Appendix C contains ASPR paragraphs
3-807.3 through 3.807-5, which are pertinent to PL 87-653.
The cost or pricing data submitted and certified
by the contractor includes ail verifiable facts existing







up to the time of the contract price agreement that prudent
buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to influence the
price negotiations. The certificate does not cover esti-
mates but does apply to the data upon which the contractor
bases his estimates of the cost of contract performance.
Under a liberal interpretation of the Act, industry feels
that the only way to comply is to present a "carload" of data
to the contracting officer. Defense Procurement Circular 55 >
with its sample data submission and completed DOD Contract
Pricing Proposal (DD Form 633), was a Government effort to
clarify the ASPR data submission requirements. This was not
a revision of regulations or procedures, but simply a restate-
ment of previously intended but incorrectly interpreted ASPR
language— in other words, a training tool.
The sample data contained in the DPC 55 is pointed
to by industry as an example of the quantity and detail of
data necessary to satisfy the Government. The DPC sample
DD Porm 633 consists of an actual eight-page Contract Pricing
Proposal submission for the relatively "simple" procurement
of a product that required the mixing of six purchased com-
2
modities. If eight pages of detail are required for this
admittedly "simple" proposal, it is argued by industry
that the quantity of data required for a complex weapons
system proposal can reach carload size.
Ibi_d. The underlined words are words of limita-
tion which definitize the broad wording of the Act.
2U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Procurement




Industry contends that ASPR places the burden of
deciding what data are of significance for submission to
the contracting officer entirely on the contractor. Ideally,
if the contracting officer would specify the data he desires
then the contractor could fulfill his responsibility by
submitting that which was specified. The contracting
officer, on the other hand, cannot rely solely upon the
contractor's submission and certification but must seek
substitutes for the examination and analysis of the pro-
2posal. Preaward audits as well as the utilization of other
sources of data must be relied upon to ensure adequate data
submissions. Both parties must be active--tbe contractor
in selecting the data he uses in compiling the proposal,
and the contracting officer in testing the data.
Defective Cost or Pricing Data
ASPR requires that the data submitted in support of
a Contract Price Proposal (DD Form 633) and certified by
the contractor to be "all data that might reasonably affect
the price negotiations
. . . [must] be accurate, complete
and current" as of the date when price negotiations were
4
concluded and the contract price agreed to. If, by audit
1Merritt -H. Steger, "Some Aspects of PL 87-653--The
Truth in Negotiations Act," Speech given at Federal Bar
Association Briefing Conference on Government Contracts,










or other means, it is discovered that the certified data
were inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent and resulted in
an inflated contract price, the Government is entitled to
a reduction in the contract price. In firm-fixed-price-
type contracts this reduction includes a profit reduction,
while in cost-type and incentive-type contracts the reduc-
tion is in price, profit fee, and/or reimbursable costs.
This right to a price reduction is a contractual right
contained in the clauses section of the contract. The
Government also contends that as a matter of fairness any
price increase due to defective cost or pricing data is
unearned; therefore, the contractor is not entitled to
keep it.
The procedure for Government implementation of the
Defective Pricing Clause is for the contracting officer to
attempt to negotiate the amount of the reduction. The
contracting officer's final decision, if not acceptable to
the contractor, is appealable to a Board of Contract
Appeals, the Comptroller General and the Court of Claims.
Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals Decisions
There have been nine significant Board of Contract
Appeals (BCA) decisions that affect the implementation of
the Truth in Negotiations Act; all have been made by the







1. American Bosch Arma Corporation (ASBCA No. 10305),
December 17, 1965.
2. EMC Corporation (ASBCA Nos. 10095 and 11115),
March 31, 1966.
3. Defense Electronics (ASBCA No. 11127), May 24,
1966.
4. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (ASBCA No. 10453),
May 18, 1967-
5. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. (ASBCA No. 10900), June 28,
1967.
6. Sparton Corporation (ASBCA No. 11363), August 25,
1967.
7. Honeywell, Inc. (ASBCA Nos. 12168, 12169, and
12170), November 23, 1967
.
8. Bell and Howell Company (ASBCA No. 11999),
April 15, 1968.
9. Aerojet-General Corporation (ASBCA No. 12264),
April 29, 1969.
Each of these cases will be briefly outlined and the ASBCA
decision will be presented.
The American Bosch Arma
Corporation Case
The first decision issued by the ASBCA under the
Defective Pricing Data clause is American Bosch Arma Corpora-
tion (ABA) . The case arose on an appeal from a contracting
officer's finding that the target price of a fixed-price
incentive contract was overstated by $185,831, resulting in
unwarranted profits of $4-5,529- ^e excess profits were
due to the contractor's "failure to disclose" during contract
price negotiations the current cost information that was •
reasonably available. The principal cost data involved were
"available purchased parts prices" for about seventy-five
different items.
In ruling on whether or not the government was
entitled to a reduction of the contract price of $45,529
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pursuant to the pre-PL 87-653 Equitable Price Reduction
clause in the contract, the Board had to come to grips with
the entire cost disclosure obligation and the DOD program
of implementation.
The Board held in this Price Reduction Clause case:
1. The contractor certification requirement implied an
obligation to furnish data which would show that cost esti-
mates on materials, although correct on May 31 5 I960, were
too high as of September 28, I960, when the contract price
was negotiated.
2. Pricing data from vendor quotations dated subsequent
to one month prior to negotiations were not reasonably
available for the negotiations.
3. Any purchase orders or vendor quotes that could be
found from examination of records, made available to Air
Force auditors who examined them during audit, was considered
disclosed to the Government.
4. Pricing data are "significant" if they would have
any significant effect for their intended purpose, which was
as an aid in negotiating a fair and reasonable price. Sig-
nificance cannot be determined as a percentage of the total
price. It should be noted that the reduction in cost of
$20,7^6 amounted to approximately .13 per cent of the
original target cost.
5. The Government has the burden of proof regarding
the effect of nondisclosure of pricing data.

56
6. In the absence of more specific evidence tending to
show what effect the nondisclosure of pricing data had on
the negotiated price, the "natural and probable consequence"
of the nondisclosure should be adopted as representing its
effect. The record showed the Government relied on and
utilized the pricing data submitted by the company.
7. The Government was entitled to a price reduction of
approximately $5,500 which is based on target profit plus
the incentive profit.
The PMC Corporation Case
The next case decided by the Board was the PMC
C orp orat ion ( PMC ) . In this case, the Government contended
that the contractor's firm-fixed-price contract should be
reduced by a sum of approximately $400,000 pursuant to the
pre-PL 87-653 Equitable Price Reduction clause in the
subject contract. The grounds for the claim were based on
an alleged failure to disclose:
1. Certain vendor quotes.
2. Information pertinent to the scrap recovery price
of aluminum.
5. On-going experimentation which later affected a
make-or-buy decision.
4. A "credit" for savings resulting from the success-
ful experimentation.
The Board held:
1. The method of negotiation—agreement on total price
or agreement on subsidiary cost— is immaterial to the effec-




2. The method of negotiation may become significant
in determining whether the Government did in fact rely upon
the data furnished or would have relied upon absent data in
reaching agreement on price.
3. Continuat: on of previously unsuccessful experimen-
tation on manufacturing methods does not constitute cost
and pricing data which should have been disclosed in negoti-
ations. Such experimentation should particularly not be
included when negotiations look to a firrn-fixed-price
contract
.
4-. Significance of data is equivalent to its capability
of being used for its intended purpose.
5. Scrap aluminum price data not disclosed was not
significant because it would not have any practical effect





Of significance, Defense Electronics, Inc ., is the
first decision under clauses established pursuant to PL 87-
653. The case involves an appeal from a contracting
officer's decision "Ghat data not disclosed during the
negotiation of a price adjustment for a change order to a
fixed-price supply contract, an advertised bid situation,
had led to an inflated contract price in the sum of
approximately $400,000. The principal Government claim
involved a failure to disclose data pertinent to a sub-
contract for key purchased parts.

58
The pivotal issue in the case was whether the Gov-
ernment could show the nondisclosure of data caused any
increase in the negotiated price.
The Board held:
1. For the Government to have any valid claim, it must
be established (i) that the contractor furnished inaccurate,
incomplete or noncurrent pricing data, (ii ) that the
inaccurate, incomplete or noncurrent pricing data caused the
price to be increased, and (iii) the dollar, amount by which
the price was increased as a result thereof. The Government
has the burden of proving every element in the chain of
proof necessary to substantiate its claim. V The Government
did not sustain this mandatory burden of proof and the
contracting officer's decision was reversed.
2. V/hen the contractor made data available to the
auditor for his use in auditing the proposal, that was
sufficient furnishing of data, and the contractor was under
no obligation to furnish to the contracting officer, per-
sonally, data not requested by him which had already been
made available to the auditor and which had been used and
referred to in the audit report.
3- A clear distinction is drawn between "fact" and
"judgment .
"
4. While the company failed to disclose significant
pricing data, the Government has not sustained the burden





The appeal in this case was filed in the name of the
prime contractor for Midwestern Instruments, Inc.
,
a sub-
contractor whose pricing data were the basis of the dispute.
The principal issue of the case was an alleged failure of
the subcontractor to disclose certain cost data concerning
material and direct labor costs, with a claim of over
$200,000 involved. Verification of the subcontractor's
proposal first submitted in February, 1962, included the
following:
1. A price analysis conducted by the prime at the
subcontractor's facilities on May 15 and 16, 1962.
2. The Air Force conducted its own price review in
September, 1962.
3. In the fall of 1963, GAO reviewed the subcontract.
The Board held:
1. The subcontractor should have disclosed that in
excess of 90 percent of the materials needed had already
been purchased and significant reductions in material costs
were experienced. The gesture allegedly made that all
records were available was practically meaningless absent
any inkling that specific significant data were in reality
present and available. In ABA there was actual disclosure,
as the auditor in fact physically examined the records and
reported the results of the examination. In this appeal
the Government auditors did not physically examine the
purchase orders, and the pricing data made available were
not complete or current.
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2. The Government is bound by its examination of the
limited records because there was disclosure to that
extent.
3. With only 3 percent of labor cost incurred, the
historical or factual data regarding the labor rate are
too minimal as a basis for a violation of the defective
pricing clause. The rate advanced by the subcontractor was
projective and v/as not, nor was it intended to be, factual
in nature.
4. "Offsetting" royalty and development cost items
were only remotely related to the material costs in issue.
The equitable reduction permitted under the defective
pricing clause is intended to cover solely the cost items
concerning which pricing data were defective. To permit
unrelated offsets would be tantamount to repricing the
entire contract.
The Cutler-Hammer Case
The appeal in this case involved a fixed-price-
incentive-fee (FPIF) type contract containing the March
1963 "Price Reduction for Defective Cost or Pricing Data"
(defective pricing) clause, which contains a reference to-
the certification requirement but does not provide for
"equity" in the price reduction. As in Lockheed the timing
involved v/as of significance.
The significant issues involving PL 87-653 were
,
first, whether the contractor could offset certain errors
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of cost understatement against errors which served to over-
state the contract price and, second, an alleged failure of
the prime contractor to disclose a quotation for a component
which was significantly lower than the quotation actually
used in negotiations.
The Board held:
1. Offsetting omissions in material pricing, in no
instance due to the improper extrapolation of quantities,
are not available for offset. PL 87-653 was intended solely
as a vehicle for recoupment by the Government of overpricing.
2. A significantly lower bid from an unproven vendor,
not disclosed to the Government, was far from being data
upon which a firm price reduction would have been reached;
but this information was significant from the standpoint of
overall contract negotiation.
3. The burden on the Government of proving the causal
relationship between significant, nondisclosed, pricing
data and the resulting price reduction is not intended to
be an "unreasonably heavy" one.
The Sparton Case
The contracting officer under two Navy contracts
had determined in accordance with the terms of the Defec-
tive Pricing clauses that Sparton Corporation owed the
Government approximately S2.4 million on the grounds that
Sparton had furnished pricing data which it knew or
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reasonably should have known were false and misleading, and
that it had failed to disclose other significant data.
The Board held:
1. The Material Price Analysis (MPA) submitted in sup-
port of the contractor's price proposal contained erroneous
information that was correctly available in the contractor's
records and from his engineers; therefore, the contractor
should have known that the MPA was erroneous and could
mislead the Government.
2. The "defective pricing" clause is not designed to
correct errors that result from approved contract changes
that take effect under contract award.
3. A price overstatement and quantity understatement
was considered not to be a false statement nor in conflict
with previous decisions relating to offsets.
4-. Whether the price has been overstated or the Gov-
ernment has been misled is not to be determined solely on
the basis of the MPA. Other evidence such as DD Form 633
and working papers must also be considered.
5. Vendor quotes must be disclosed to the Government
if they can "reasonably be expected to have a significant
bearing on costs under the proposed contract." In order
to establish contractor liability the Government must
establish that at the time the data are submitted the
contractor did not intend to do business with the vendor




This case involves an appeal of the Government's
claim that Honeywell, as a subcontractor, had concealed and
misrepresented cost data in price negotiations and thereby
had overcharged the prime Government contractor. The prime
contractor had assigned to the United States such claims
as it might have against the subcontractor for misrepre-
sentation or concealment of cost or pricing data. Therefore,
Honeywell, the subcontractor, has no privity with the
Government and thus no standing before the Board.
The Board held:
1. However effective and valuable to the subcontractor
the opportunity to participate in or secure from the prime
contractor the latter' s right of appeal may be, it is
difficult to view that opportunity as an independent right
of the subcontractor.
2. Even if the Board had authority under some circum-
stances to nullify this type of appeal right assignment on
the grounds that it is unauthorized (a question which the
Board expressly did not decide), such authority may not be
exercised at the insistence of a subcontractor that has
entered into no agreement with the Government or the prime
contractor which designates the Armed Services Board of




Comp ahy~"~Ca s e
An Initial fuze order was negotiated on a fixed-
price incentive contract which was subsequently modified
"by an additional quantity. The contract was revised and
became a firm fixed-price contract. The Government con-
tended that at the time of the modification the contractor
had possession of six low subcontractor bids which were not
disclosed. Bell and Howell contended that at the time of
contract negotiation there were valid reasons not to place
the orders with the six vendors and that this information
had been orally passed to Government representatives.
The Board held:
1. The six low quotes, not disclosed to the Government
during negotiation of a contract modification, are con-
sidered cost or "pricing data. " The contractor was actively
and vigorously engaged in negotiations with and making plant
surveys of the low quote vendors.
2. It is unrealistic to assume that the six low quotes
from untried sources would be completely reliable. Experi-
ences under prior contracts indicate a serious risk in
entering into firm-fixed-price contracts for these fuzes.
3- If quotes disclosed, the most likely effect would
have been to cause the negotiators to conclude that the




4. Probable consequence would have been a 60/40 sharing
arrangement on cost overruns as in the original contract.
Accordingly, the Government is entitled to 60 percent of the
savings realized from use of the six low quotes.
5. These rules are not intended to be findings of what
would have happened if there had been a disclosure of the
low quotes. Rather, they are intended to be a basis for
determining the probable effect of the nondisclosure on the
price. This is a situation where the nondisclosure is bound
to have a significant effect but it is impossible to
determine the precise effect.
Aerojet-General
Corporation Case
The Government claims entitlement to a reduction of
more than $500,000 in the target cost of the prime contract,
together with appropriate adjustments in the other pricing
elements, on the grounds that the contractor did not furnish
accurate, complete, and current cost data concerning the
costs of nozzles being manufactured by its subcontractor,
Straza Industries (hereinafter referred to as Straza).
The contractor contends that it submitted to the
contracting officer accurate, complete, and current cost
data as of the date it executed a "Certificate of Current
Cost or Pricing Data" and furnished it to the respondent.
The contractor contends further that the Government
did not rely upon the contractor's cost or pricing data




1. Prior to the commencement of negotiations with the
Government and prior to the date of execution of the
"Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data," the contrac-
tor had conducted engineering analyses and studies on the
basis of which it had determined that Straza's quotations
of extra costs for nozzle changes -were significantly
overstated.
2. The cost analysis which the contractor furnished
the Government, and which it certified to, contained the
price quotations by Straza which were significantly over-
stated; knowledge of the overstatement was reasonably
available to the contractor on or before the latter date.
5. The contractor did not include with its submission
of cost and pricing data any reference to or copies of the
engineering analysis, cost estimates, or other data which
would have disclosed the contractor's conclusion that
Straza's prices were significantly overstated.
4. Negotiators proceeded upon the erroneous assumption
that the cost or pricing data furnished the Government on
October 10, 1962, and updated through December 4, 1962, were
accurate, complete, and current, and that both parties used
the cost data, including the data relating to the nozzles,





A view of the nine ASBCA decisions and their inter-
relationships will give a better understanding of the
Board's decision process and their view of the Truth in
Negotiations Act. The Board's decisions can also give an
insight into the implementation of PL 87-653.
The sequence that best applies to this survey
follows the questions that the Government must answer in
proving its price reduction case for defective cost or
pricing data. The questions are:
1. What constitutes cost or pricing data that must
be submitted?
2. Were the data actually submitted?
3. Were the data certified to be accurate, current,
and complete?
l\-. What was the effect of the defective data; was
the effect significant?
5. Were the data available when required?
6. Are offsets allowed?
The answers to these questions have resulted in varied
findings by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
Each question will be discussed separately.
1. What constitutes cost or pricing data that must be
submitted?
The Sparton case illustrates the responsibility of
the contractor to submit data which should reasonably be
expected to have a significant effect on costs. The Board
has held that it is not necessary for the contractor, at
the time of data submission, to submit vendor quotes that
1ASPR, par. 3-807- 3(e)
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are not intended to be utilized. This holding is contrary
to ASPR and Cu1 1 er-Hamme
r
in that low quotes, whether
'unsolicited or not, were a required part of the data sub-
mission. This test of data does not follow a formula but
rather must be viewed in light of the negotiation situation.
There is also the differentiation between "fact," which is
submissible, and "judgmental" information, which is data
upon which the contractor's judgment is based and need not
be submitted. The FMC case demonstrated the "fact" versus





studies which revealed significantly overstated subcontractor
quotes were not disclosed as cost or pricing data. Neither
Government or contractor negotiator knew of the contrac-
tor's studies, but this was held immaterial since it was
reasonably available. Of interest here is that although the
estimates had judgmental factors, these were not controlling.
The contractor would not be held responsible for "judgment"
errors— only errors of "fact," which is what the studies
were
.
2. Were the data submitted?
In addition to determining what data are to be sub-
mitted, the question of what constitutes "submission" arises.




to satisfy ASPR. ASPR was subsequently changed to remedy
this loophole. After the ASPR revision, in PMC and Lockheed,
the fact that fifty Government auditors were in residence at
the plant site or that the records were available was
irrelevant to the submission requirement. The Government's
position is that "making available" of records would relieve
the contractor of the responsibility to submit the informa-
tion that would give the two parties to the negotiation
equal knowledge, which was the original intent of the Act.
3. Were the data certified to be accurate, current,
and complete?
In the ABA and Lockheed cases, contracts were negoti-
ated prior to the passage of PL 87-653 and, therefore, did
not tie-in the price reduction clause with the contractor
executed certification. Thus, dependence was not predicated
upon the certification for the ASBCA price reduction decision.
These decisions, then, cannot be used as guides today. At
present, the certificate is an integral part of the price
reduction clause for defective cost or pricing data. In
cases where the contractor is not required to certify data
(when there exists adequate price competition or the item is
listed in an established catalog or there exists a market
price for the commercially sold item to the general public)
there is little likelihood of contractor liability.
Gilbert A. Cuneo, Robert L. Ackerly, and John
Lane, Jr., "Truth in Negotiations—Part II: Submission of
Cost and Pricing Data, Audit, Remedies, and Subcontractor
Problems," Briefing Papers, No. 68-4, The Government Con-





4. What was the effect of the defective data; was
the effect significant?
In ABA and Lockheed the "natural and probable conse-
quences" of the defective data upon the price can be presumed
to be, in the absence of evidence, that defective data were
used. This does not shift the problem of proof from the
Government to the contractor, but, rather, shifts the burden
of going forward with the evidence to the contractor. It
establishes a rebuttal presumption. In the Bell and Howell
case the Government proved defective data and the contractor
did not prove nonreliance. The Board found that the burden
of proof had remained with the Government and the consequence
of the defective data did not increase the price dollar for
dollar.
The ruling in one aspect of the Defense Electronics
case was that the Government had not sustained its
burden of proving that a nondisclosure caused a price
increase. This decision was the "probable consequence" as
reasoned by the Boai:'d from the facts presented.
In addition, the dollar amount of the increase in
price resulting from the defective data must be established
in order to "reduce accordingly." Here, the difficulty
arises when the negotiations are on the total costs and not
on specific cost elements. In Cutler-Hammer and ABA the
Board held that the amount of the defect is equivalent to
the price reduction, whereas in Sparton the Government
settled for a 60 percent sharing of the saving from
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utilization of the undisclosed low bids since, if disclosed,
a 60/40 sharing of the risk would have been probable.
The term "significant" as applied to nondisclosed
data appears when a price reduction is discussed. ABA held
that significance cannot be determined as a percentage of
the cost. In EMC and Defense Electronics
,
the Board
explained that "significance of data" is a subjective test
to be applied in light of the facts of the negotiating
situation, i.e., its use as an aid in negotiation. Industry
feels that this test of significance is in reality a test of
hindsight.
5. Were current data available when required for
negotiations?
The establishment of the period of time during which
the contractor is obligated to disclose cost or pricing data
is the fifth item in the sequence. The "reasonable avail-
ability" of vendor quotations has fluctuated from a period
of less than thirty-four days prior to price agreement in
ABA to twenty-one days in Lockhee d, and to thirteen days in
FMC in the instance of a scrap aluminum price. The use of
an "as of" date In the certification removes uncertainty
about the date the data are required.
6. Are offsets allowed?
Essentially, the problem is: If cost or pricing
data are defective in several respects, some increasing the
In ABA the reduction amounted to .13 percent of
the original target amount, whereas in EMC the amount was
.16 percent and was considered "not significant."
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price and others decreasing the price, can the increase or
decrease be netted, so as to offset each other and thereby
lessen the price reduction? An offset was denied in Lock-
heed
,
but industry felt that in the future the Board might
consider limited offsets in the case of related "overs" and
"unders." This hope was removed in Cu1 1 er-Hamme
r
when the
Board flatly denied offsets. The Board concluded that the
Congressional intent of PL 87-653 was to act as a recoupment
vehicle for the Government in cases of overpricing. It is
argued that the no-offset rule prevents the contractor from
repricing the contract. To permit offset would be to blunt
the bite of the Act.
The Sparton case disregarded the Board's previous
decision in Lockheed and Cut 1 er-Hamm e
r
by permitting the
offset of an. overpriced tube with the understating of the
quantity of tubes required. The Sparton case has confused
industry and Government alike regarding the application of
the no-offset rule. The ASPR permits offsets of the Sparton
type, and industry agrees that PL 87-653 provides for only
downward price adjustments. This confusion should be
settled when the Court of Claims hands down its decision
on the subject, the first review of a Truth in Negotiations
case.
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, "Govern-
ment Contracts: Truth-in-Wegotiations Law," Memorandum
GC-22, July 24, 1967, p. 16.
2Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v U.S., Court of Claims 364-67.
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Implications of Board Decisions
A General Counsel of the Navy Department offered his
opinion that "on the whole industry thus far has not fared
too "badly under the law and that both Government and industry
are learning to live with the law." He also feels that the
ASPE changes have "clarified" and "definitized" the Act and
codified the applicable rulings. • After the first three
ASBCA decisions in the price reduction, data disclosure area,
an industry publication tends to concur:
If a single characterization were appropriate, it
would be fair to say that the Board is apparently
trying to make manageable what might be otherwise
an unmanageable requirement .
2
More recently the same organization has observed that
the ASPE and the Board decisions "ignore the practical diffi-
culties inherent in defining data, identifying those data
really required and the submission difficulties which attach."
Industry points out that there are many unanswered questions
which inrpede implementation of the Act. The questions which
it is felt are unanswered by ASPR or ASBCA decisions are:
1. Does a contractor's offer to submit data prior to
agreement on price, whether or not accepted by the Government,
satisfy the disclosure obligation?
1 Steger, "Some Aspects of P.L. 87-653," p. 5-
2Machinery and Allied Products Institute, "Government
Contracts: The Cost or Pricing Data Submission Program,"
Memorandum GC-17, July 27, 1966, p. 6.
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, "Government
Contracts: Truth in Negotiations Law," Memorandum GC-22,
July 24-, 1967, p. 20.
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2. When are data to be regarded as "actually disclosed"
and must there be identification of specific data?
3- What obligation does the Government have to request
data specifically when the availability and pertinency of
such data are obvious at the time of price negotiations?
4. Are unused low bids to be submitted as required by
ASPR when they fail the "significance" test and are held
unnecessary by Sparton?
Confusion
Part of the confusion that afflicts the implementation
of the Act stems from the changing ASPR regulations as well
as Congressional and GAO pressures on DOD to tighten regula-
tions. These problems are the result of the conflicting
ASBCA decisions. Questions answered by today's Board deci-
sion appear unanswered tomorrow. Cuneo views the ASBCA
decisions as being consistently in favor of the Government.
He further states that he cannot "recall any other instance
where ambiguities in the application of a statute have so
2
consistently and uniformly been construed against the public."
The only salvation ' that industry spokesmen see for the Act is
for the ASBCA decisions to be reviewed by a court and the
earliest court review is at least a year away in the Cutler-
Hammer case on offsets.
pp. 99-100.
2




The Corporate Director of Contract Policy and Plan-
ning at the Boeing Company points out that the Act is self-
enforcing through the rewriting for implementation of the
act in ASPR to give the Government the benefit of the doubt:
When the government shows that something which will be
called "data" existed prior to negotiations, was either
known to or should have been known to the contractor,
could have affected the negotiated price in the govern-
ment's favor, was not identified through auditable
documentation to the negotiator for the government, the
contractor must pay back the amount of a presumed over-
pricing unless he can prove that the result of the
negotiation would have been either less advantageous
to the government or entirely not the government's dis-
advantage. So says the law as it is now implemented.!
A representative of Simdstrand Aviation feels that
industry is being forced into a situation where it is
becoming more important to justify and protect its negoti-
2
ation position than to get a fair and reasonable price.
Critics and supporters alike contend that in spite
of the problems and the criticisms of the Act, it is here
to stay. It also appears that the implementation of the
Act is building a mutual hostility between Government and
industry. Nevertheless, there must be mutual respect as
well as mutual need between customer and supplier in addition
to ethical practices by both parties. The Deputy Director of
DCAA, Bernard B. Lynn, believes that criticism of the "law
and its administration have just about peaked," and that the
John A. O'Kara, "Living with the Lav/," in The Truth
in Negotiations Act... A MAPI Symposium, pp. 160-68,






new efforts to train and supervise DOD contract personnel
and revise the ASPR will improve administration of the law.
Impl ementation
The best characterization of the implementation prob-
lem is that there is substantial confusion between the objec-
tive of the Act as it was passed--the objective of truth in
negotiations— and what is actually happening in the administra-
2tion of the Act in an attempt to achieve this objective. It
appears that rather than achieving the objective of getting
all the necessary information on the negotiation table, GAO
is more interested in an audit trail. This policy relegates
the actual negotiation and a resulting fair and reasonable
price to a secondary position. This preoccupation with audits
could be due to the Accounting versus Procurement influence
in GAO.
Nash suggests that the way the implementation of the
Act is headed the probable result will be (1) perfect docu-
mentation and an inability to arrive at a price; (2) an over-
kill of the implementation, especially auditing from a cost-
effectiveness standpoint; and (3) the dilution of preaward
'
audit efforts by postaward activity.
These observations are supported by the continuing
GAO efforts to revise the implementation procedures by
Bernard B. Lynn, "Contract Audits Under the Truth




2Ralph C. Nash, Jr., "The Future of the Truth in







revising the ASPR. The "blue-book reports arc a prime example
of the pressure applied by GAO to influence Congress for
stronger legislation and to force DOD to tighten the implemen-
tation of the Act through ASPR revisions.
Summary
The answer to the subsidiary question "Has the lav;
been fully implemented by Government and accepted by industry?"
can sum up Chapter III.
The discussion in Chapter III shows that since 19&2,
when the Truth in Negotiations Act was passed by Congress,
there have been significant changes in the regulations that
implement the Act. The changes have been brought about by
conflicting as well as complementary ASBCA decisions, GAO
efforts to bring the ASPR more in line with its interpretation
of the original Act, amendments to the Act itself as a result
of GAO reports of industry noncompliance, and finally, by
the ASPR committee's effort to make the ASPR more effective,
uniform, and equitable in administering the Act.
The effect of the past seven years of conflict has
been that the implementing regulations have been kept in a
state of perpetual motion. The Act needs time to settle in





Pre-contract award and post-contract award audits
of contractor records by the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) will be discussed in this chapter. DCAA ' s authority
to perform audits of contractors' records, the purpose of
the audits, and their effect on the implementation of
PL 87-653 will be explored. A brief background sketch of
DCAA will precede the discussion.
The Audit Agency
Background
Prior to 1965 the individual armed services and the
Defense Supply Agency of the Department of Defense supplied
their own individual auditing staffs to perform contract
audits on contractors and subcontractors who were vying
for, or had been awarded, government contracts. This dupli-
cation of contract administration effort within the Department
of Defense was terminated with the establishment of the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) on July 1, 1965, "by a
Department of Defense Directive issued by Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara.
U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Contract
Audit Agency
,





The DCAA consists of a Headquarters located at
Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia, and seven regional
offices located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta,
Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. As the Defense
Department ' s only face to industry in auditing matters,
DCAA conducts audits on more than 4-, 800 businesses, univer-
sities, and other institutions. By September 1968 there
were a total of 3>900 DCAA employees, and of this number
400 were Certified Public Accountants. The Agency audited
$24 billion in cost incurring contracts and evaluated
21,600 prospective price proposals. In addition to the
seven regional staffs, there are resident audit staffs
located at the plants of the larger Government contractors.
There are also local DCAA branch offices located in areas
of high industrial density to cover the smaller contractors
and subcontractors.
The DCAA was founded, with the mutual concurrence
of all the Defense agencies, by the consolidation of the
various separate auditing staffs under one director, who is
responsible directly to the Secretary of Defense. The con-
solidation was also welcomed by industry, who would then .
have to deal with only one agency on audit matters. Concrete
advantages would also accrue because of the elimination of
duplication, its attendant inefficiency, and higher costs.
U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Contract





DOD ' s implementing directive defines the purpose
of the DCAA:
The basic purpose of contract auditing is to
assist in achieving the objective of prudent contract-
ing by providing those responsible for procurement
and contract administration with financial information
and advice on proposed or existing contracts and con-
tractors, as appropriate. Audit services of the DCAA
shall be utilized by procurement and contract adminis-
tration activities to the extent appropriate in
connection with the negotiation, administration and
settlement of contract payments or prices which are
based on. cost (incurred or estimated), or on cost
analysis.
1
The intent of the implementing directive is to task DCAA
to perform the audit functions required by contracting and
procurement officials in DOD. The audits will assist the
purchasing officers in carrying out their functions in an
efficient, timely, and professional manner, to the best
advantage of the Government. These auditing functions are
performed during the entire life cycle of a procurement,
from preaward audit to postaward audit to final payment,
which includes the audit and other financial aspects of




The auditing of defense contracts is the responsi-
bility of the Director of DCAA, within the limits prescribed
by the Contract Audit Manual of DCAA. The contracting
Department of Defense Directive 5105-36 (1965).
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officer is required by ASPR to request an audit review of
the cost or pricing data submitted on the Contract Pricing
Proposal (DD Form 633) by DCAA prior to negotiation, change,
or modification of a contract. The exceptions to this
requirement apply if the contract, change, or modification:
1. Is not expected to exceed $100,000.
2. Is based on adequate price competition.
3. Is based on established catalog or market
price of items enjoying substantial commer-
cial sales or is based on a price set by
law or regulation.
4. Is based on the head of agency's written
waiver.
5. Is less than $100,000 if there is no satis-
factory method of price analysis--this is
discretionary. -*-
DCAA is not responsible for selecting contractors'
proposals to be audited or when to waive audits. It is
DCAA ' s task to make pre-contract award audits when requested
by the contracting officers, as fully as possible and prior
to the completion of the negotiation of the contract.
However, when it is necessary to provide assurance that
defective cost or pricing data were not submitted, audits
should also be conducted of actual costs incurred after the
2
contracts are consummated. The ASPR now provides for the
inclusion of a clause in noncompetitive firm-fixed-price
contracts as well as the previously specified cost type
contracts involving certified costs or pricing data that
will ensure a contractual right of DCAA to access to the
1ASPR, par. 3-807.
pDefense Procurement Circular No. 37 , Deputy




contractor's actual performance records. 1 Situations which
may require the use of the postaward performance audit might
include such cases as:
1. Urgency in placing the initial procurement
limited the time allowed for the preaward
audits.
2. Material costs are a significant portion of
the contractor's total cost estimate.
3. Substantial subcontracting of the contract.
4. Substantial interval between pre-contract cost
evaluation and agreement on price.
5. Contractor's failure to disclose all available
data or, if it became available after the
audit.
2
Without the benefit of after-the-fact performance data, DOD
is often unable to verify that all appropriate data were
furnished in the negotiation and that the contractor per-
formed as represented at the outset.
GAO discovered in its postaward audit reviews in
1965 and 1966 that certain cost information was not dis-
closed by contractors or it became available after preaward
4
audits were performed. This led to the conclusion that
preaward audits were not entirely effective in disclosing
1ASPR, par. 7-104.41.
2House, Subcommittee Hearings on Review of Defense
Procurement Policies, Part I 1,1967), PP- 58 , 4-4-.
'A
U.S., Congress, Pious e, Review of Defense Procure-
ment Policies, Procedures, and Practices, Part I: Truth in
Negotiatio ns, Report of the Subcommittee for Special Investi-
gations^ 90th Cong., 2d s'ess., February 29, 1968, p. 10.
U.S., General Accounting Office, Need for Postaward
Audits t o Detect Lack of Disclosure of Significant Cost or
Pricing Data Prior to Contract Ne got i
a
t i on and _ Awa t~:1 , Report
to Congress, B-158193, February 23, 1%6, pp. "1-2.
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cost estimates that were excessive, in light of information
available, at the time of negotiation and contract award.
Postaward audits were effective in disclosing this informa-
tion and in determining the extent of contractor compliance
with PL 87-653. Postaward audits also provided a basis for
price adjustments under the defective pricing data clause
of the Truth in Negotiations Act. The effectiveness of post-
award auditing prompted GAO to recommend to the Department
of Defense, and report to Congress, that a systematic DCAA
postaward review program be instituted. Up to this time
DCAA ' s Contract Audit Manual provided for only general
surveillance of this area and not for regularly scheduled
postaward reviews.
Preaward Audi t s
The requirement
As a result of PL 87-653 contractors are required
to submit cost or pricing data under certain conditions,
which have been discussed earlier, and to certify that such
data are current, accurate, and complete. The lav/ also
provides for downward price adjustments, in favor of the
Government, if it is discovered that any defective data had
significantly increased the negotiated price of the contract.
It is DCAA ' s primary mission to perform the preaward
audits and not to wait until the contract has been awarded





The ASPR requires the contracting officer to deter-
mine the requirement for, and to request an audit review of
contractor submitted price proposals. It then becomes the
DCAA auditor's responsibility to conduct the audit review
of the contractor's actual or estimated costs. The depth
of the audit is determined by the auditor, relying on his
experience with the contractor and utilizing appraisals of
the effectiveness of the contractor's purchasing policies,
procedures, controls, and practices. Audit reviews or
audits may consist of desk .reviews , test checks of a limited
number of transactions, or examinations in depth, at the
2discretion of the auditor.
Postaward Audits
Why postaward auditing?
In order to comply with the recommendations of GAO
and to rectify the paucity of defective pricing reports that
GAO felt should be flowing back to contracting officers as
a result of postaward audits, DCAA promulgated a regulation
in March of 1966. This regulation, entitled "Performance
of Defective Pricing Reviews," defined the DCAA role in
assisting in the implementation of PL 87-653- The "Review"





scheduled postaward program of audits to determine contractor
compliance with the contract certification that complete,
current, and accurate cost data had been submitted. The
scope and extent of this program is dependent upon the
availability of auditors and the number of price proposals,
which have priority and must be accomplished first.
How performed ?
DCAA's postaward audit objective is to make a
factual determination, not investigative, concerning the
data submitted and certified by the contractor prior to
contract award. Upon completion of the audit, and if
required, an "advisory" report evidencing "apparent"
defective pricing is forwarded to the contracting officer
for his action, legal proceedings and/or further investiga-
tion, and final disposition.
The volume of price proposal audits, which are
especially heavy because of Vietnam requirements, leave
little time for the implementation of the "review" program.
The following criteria are utilized in selecting contracts
for audit in order to choose those contracts with the
highest probability of defective data:
(a) significant cost underrun,
(b) contract amounts and product complexity,
(c) information gained in the performance of
initial pricing reviews and from the records of
contract negotiations furnished in accordance with
the ASPE (absence of initial pricing reviews,
restriction on the scope of such reviews, evidence




(d) information gained in other audits indicating
the possibility that certain pricing data were defec-
tive.
(e) refunds or allowances tendered by a subcontrac-
tor to a prime contractor are included in this category,
(f) contracting officer requests.
^
Some of the specific points that are inspected and
which would tend to indicate defective cost or pricing data
are
:
(a) significant decreases in component costs,
(b) operations not actually performed, or costs
not in fact incurred,
(c) evidence on the part of the contractor that
he could reasonably expect to buy components for less
than the price proposed,
(d) failure to reflect the benefits of management,
production and budgetary decisions which must have
been known to management,
(e) whether prime contractors have used defective
pricing clauses in their subcontracts,
(f) recorded costs, when pertinent,
(g) vendors' quotations,
(h) purchase order dates,
(i) refunds and credits from suppliers.
Prior to the publication of the DPG 57 revision of
ASPR in November, 1967? it was not possible for Government
auditors to perform postaward audits on firm-fixed-price
contracts involving certified cost or pricing data. The
House Subcommittee for Special Investigations found that
several contractors had taken a position that they were not
obligated to use or supply available costs of prior per-
formance for the pricing of follow-on contracts, although
Villard 0. Vick, "Role of Defense Contract Audit
Agency under Public Law 87-653?" Public Contract Law
Journal
,




the cost records were pertinent to the contract. After
contract award the contractor would contend that PL 87-653
and the terms of negotiated firm-fixed-price contracts did
not entitle DCAA in particular, or the Government in general,
2
to examine records from completed contracts. The subcom-
mittee felt that this secrecy deprived the Government of a
valuable tool for the verification of contract .prices and
the feedback that would improve contract negotiating,
auditing, and evaluation of proposals. The Department of
Defense acceded to a GAO recommendation for such audit
access, resulting in issuance of DPC 57- Secretary Nitze
reiterated that it is "and remains the policy of Department
of Defense that in firm fixed-price contracts the cost and
profit consequences are the full responsibility of the
contractor since he assumes all the risk of performing in
accordance with the contract."-^ Secretary Nitze further
stressed that postaward audits are for one purpose and one
purpose only, i.e., "determining whether or not defective
cost or pricing data was submitted." Repricing of contracts
or profit versus cost ratios are not to be evaluated unless
there is defective cost or pricing data.
House, Report on Review of Defense Procurement
Policies, Part I U~9~6ST, p.IT
2Ibid.




Industry has become concerned about the rewording
of the ASPR clause that gave DCAA
the right to examine those books, records, documents,
papers and other supporting data which involve trans-
actions relat ed to this c ontract or which will permit
adequate evaluation of the cost or pricing data sub-
mitted, along with the computations and projections
used therein. 1 (Italics mine.)
Secretary Nitze's comments notwithstanding, some DOD
officials believe that the language of this clause will
extend audit access to records on the sale of the commer-
2
cially equivalent items on the commercial market. It is
observed from this concern on the part of industry that there
might be justification on the part of the Government to "full
disclosure" and for postaward audit of data "which involve
transactions related to this contract."
If profits are increased, costs reduced by effective
management or savings device and PL 87-653 has been complied
with, there will not be a recomputation of the contract
price. Costs and prices are a matter worthy of note and if
knov/n to all contracting officers could save the Government
money on other contracts for like items. For this reason
GAO and DCAA feel justified in holding contractor record
reviews at any time up to the three-year date of expiration
of the statute of limitations.
^SPR, par. 7-104.41.
2Machinery and Allied Products Institute, "Government
Contracts: Truth- in-Negotiations Lav/," Memorandum GC-24,





In order for the DCAA auditor to carry out the
required audits and formulate an informed opinion, the
auditor must have access to those substantiating documents
that support both factual and forecasted cost data. In
addition to historical data, the availability of vendor
quotations, unit cost trends, make-or-buy decisions, or
other management decisions which could reasonably be expected
to have a significant bearing on proposed costs could be
required by the auditor and should be made available.
Denial of access
to records
A recent GAO Report to Congress on a DCAA survey of
Contractors Price Proposals, subject to PL 87-653? discussed
2the access-to-records problem. The types of records that
were restricted by the contractor included historical data,
vendor material quotations, and supporting documents for
overhead rates. A DCAA internal report of 164- locations
disclosed that from their experience budgets, financial
statements, tax returns, boards of directors' minutes, and
^SPR, par. 3-807.3.
2U.S., General Accounting Office, Survey of Reviews
by the Defense Contract Audit Agency of Contractors
'
'Pro-




B- 39995, February 15, 1967, p. 36-.
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internal audit reports were restricted more often than
individual cost records.
It is not possible to state categorically what
records can and what records cannot "be audited by DCAA.
There are virtually no helpful precedents in this area,
because disputes are almost always resolved on a case-by-
case basis without litigation. The one court decision
pertinent to the access-to-records question was the
Hew 1 e 1 1 -Packar
d
case, which affirmed contract "Examination
of Records" clauses and gave GAO the right to examine all
"directly pertinent" books and records "involving trans-
actions relating to this contract" including production
2
records m the procurement of a commercial item.
The contractor grants to the contracting officer or
his representative the right to examine the substantiating
records, by his submission of the proposal, i.e. the
DD Form 633- Despite the ASPE and DD Form 633 enumeration
of the types of records to be made available to Government
auditors, the access-to-records problem was determined to




2Hewlett-Packard Co. v. U.S., 385 F.2d 1013 (C.A. 9,





5GA0, Report to Congress, B-39995, February, 1967,
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Access-to-records controversies delay procurement,
frustrate negotiations, and tend to build up mistrust between
the Government and contractors as well as qualify the
auditor's reports. If the records controversy cannot be
resolved at the audit site it should be referred to a cen-
tralized DCAA group at the Cameron Station DCAA Headquarters
where the problem can be dealt with on a more uniform and
effective basis. If DCAA Headquarters is unable to resolve
the impasse, then the Office of the Secretary of Defense
should be asked for assistance.
The Government contends that whatever records are
disclosed to it are kept in confidence; nevertheless,
"industry fears its proprietary information will be jeopar-
dized by giving postaward audit authority to the Defense
2Department." Despite industry reluctance to concede,
DPC 57 was instituted.
Summary
The proper and effective functioning of PL 87-655
is predicated upon complete, current, and accurate cost or
pricing data submissions by contractors. Experience has
shown that errors of all types can creep into the submitted
proposals and that the data submitted can change due to






"D0D to Start Post-Award Audits," Aviation Week &
Space Technology
,
LXXXVII (December 4, 1967), 26.
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Because of these factors the role of the DCAA contract
auditor has assumed vital importance to the overall procure-
ment cycle. His informed reports, if timely and unqualified,
are essential to effective contract negotiation.
It has been stated that the purpose of pre- and
post-contract award audits is to determine the validity of
contractor submitted cost or pricing data. The validity
of the data as it relates to the determination of the
contract target price is the ultimate test of whether
defective data were submitted. The only purpose of the
audits, then, is to ensure that the data submitted were not
deceptive. Audits are not motivated by a desire to recoup
profits that resulted from technological breakthroughs,
ingenuity, or improved production methods. Cost under-
runs themselves do not equate to defective pricing. Even
if an underrun is the result of overestimates in the con-
tractor's proposal, defective pricing is not the culprit
unless there was a defect in the factual data submitted.
The Government is not requiring the contractor to certify
his "judgment as to the estimated portion of future costs
p
or projection," only to fact.
How effective Government contract negotiations have
been remains to be determined by the postaward audits con-





of proposal cost or pricing data, the postaward audit is an
invaluable tool to sharpen contracting, negotiating, and
auditing expertise. It is felt by the General Counsel of
DCAA that the greatest value of the postaward audit program
is an improvement in contractor proposals and preaward
audits due to the likelihood of later audits.
As to the effectiveness of postaward auditing, it is
believed that it is performing its function of saving money
for the Government, although at present there is no record
or measure of the actual dollar value saved. Even if a
dollar-value saving were available there is no benchmark to
be used as a comparison. The establishment of the postaward
audit program is" a worthy project, but to fulfill the task
without an increase in auditing staff will detract from
DCAA ' s primary task of preaward audits that assist contract-
ing officers in the negotiation of fair and reasonable
prices.
Personal interview with Villard 0. Vick, held at





Chapter V will place the role of the Government
Accounting Office in its proper perspective relative to the
Truth in Negotiations Act, the Department of Defense, and
the Congress. As an example of the results produced by GAO
audits, recent GAO testimony "before Congress and its effect
upon the ASPR and the Act will be presented.
Purpose of GAO
The major objective of GAO is to assist the Congress
of the United States in maintaining the surveillance
necessary for effective legislative oversight of the complex
of governmental programs and operations. Operating under
the direction of Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats is the
GAO staff of 4,300 people, of which 2,4-50 are professional
p
accounting and audit staffers. Approximately 1,100 of the
professional staff are assigned to Defense operations with
U.S., General Accounting Office, Annual Report, 1968








275 of these people performing Defense Procurement and
1Contracting audits.
One of the basic roles of GAO is that of an inde-
pendent auditor whose primary purpose is to examine the
adequacy and effectiveness of the system of management and
internal control, including internal governmental agency
audits. The scope of this responsibility extends to
activities conducted under contract as well as to those
which the governmental agency itself conducts.
In order to perform its independent review functions
as part of the legislative arm of the Government, GAO has
been provided certain broad authorities by law for access
2to contractors' records. The principal authority provided
by these laws is the authority of the Comptroller General
and his representatives to examine the records of contractors
and subcontractors. This authority applies to the books,
documents, and records that directly pertain to and involve
transactions relating to Government contracts or subcontracts
This audit authority is effective for a three-year period
commencing on the date of final contract payment.
House, Subcommittee Hearing s on Review of Defense
Procurement Policies, Part I ( 1 967 ) , p. 10.
2Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (51 U.S.C. 55);
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (51 U.S.C. 67);
Armed Services Procurement Act (10 U.S.C. 2515 [b]); Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act (41 U.S.C. 254[c]);




Keeping in mind that GAO auditing and early (1955)
interest in Defense procurement and contracting procedures
brought about the Truth in Negotiations Act, it is not
surprising that GAO has professed a continuing interest in
the subject. As late as 1967 GAO was advocating improved
ASPR administrative procedures for the implementation of the
Act. In addition to administration of the existing Act,
GAO recommended to Congress changes to the Act in order to




In its capacity as an arm of Congress, GAO provides
many services. Principal among them are:
1. Audit reports to Congress.
2. Special audit and investigative reports as
requested by committees and individual Members
of Congress.
3. Direct staff assistance to committees.
4. Comments to committees on pending legislation.
5. Advisory assistance in legal and legislative
matters.
6. Testimony at hearings.
7. Recommendations for legislation.
8. Accounting and. auditing advice on House and
Senate financial and administrative operations.
During the period preceding the enactment of PL 87-653, as
discussed in Chapter II, GAO performed all of the above
services in order to show Congress the need for additional
-"-U.S., General Accounting Office, -Need for Improving
Administration of the Cost or Pricing Data Requirements of
Public Law 87-653 in the Award of Prime Contracts and Sub-
contracts . Report to the Congress of the United States,
B- 39995, January 16, 1967.
^House, Subcommittee Hearings on Review of Defense
Procurement Policies, Part I (1967), pp. 31-52.
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contracting legislation. Reports to Congress, blue-book
reports, commenced in 1957 to present the problems that
surrounded Government operations. GAO also supplied testi-
mony supporting Mr. Vinson's efforts to control incentive
contracting. As enactment of a truth-in-negotiation type
of lav/ drew near, GAO supported the DOD premise that if a
law was needed, then all negotiated contracting should be
covered. In the final stages of the legislative procedure
GAO lawyers assisted in the drafting of the actual
legislation that became PL 87-653-
Testimony Before Congress
An example of GAO involvement with the continued
implementation of the ASPR and PL 87-653 took place in 1967*
In testimony before the House subcommittee for Special
Investigations, Charles M. Bailey, Deputy Director of the
Defense Division of GAO, stressed the following areas of
the ASPR that had a need for improvement:
1. Need for improvement in contractor's submission
of cost or pricing data in support of proposed prices. GAO
audits have turned up a substantial number of cases where
there has been no record of contractor submitted cost or
pricing data, or, if submitted, it was incomplete. There
have also been revealed instances where cost or pricing
information that became available between the time the
contractor submitted the proposal and the time of negotiation
was not furnished to the Government.
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2. Need for improvement in evaluation of contracting
proposals by agency officials. Internal Government audits
have disclosed inadequate technical evaluations of proposed
costs based on the contractor's engineering documentation.
GAO is also concerned about the apparent lack of supporting-
documentation, supervisory review, or criteria for evalu-
ation of contractor proposals. There also appears to be a
lack of depth and scope in the preaward audits as well as in
the utilization of noncurrent price or cost experience data.
3. Need for improvement in actions by contracting
officers for establishing reasonable negotiated prices.
High contract prices were found by GAO auditors to be due
in part to the failure of contracting officers to request
preaward audits because of lack of time in an urgent procure-
ment. There is also a failure to request postaward audits
for the same reason. There has been a reluctance by con-
tracting officers to utilize the advisory findings and
recommendations that are available for proposed evaluation.
GAO alleges that contracting officers are not requiring cost
or pricing data in "questionable" cases by determining that
"adequate price competition" or "catalog or market price"
1
exceptions apply.
Resul t of GAO testimony
The immediate result of this GAO testimony to




Report to Congress was the DOD issuance of two Defense Pro-
curement Circulars. In view of the GAO testimony, Congress
commenced a study that ultimately resulted in the passage
2
of an amendment to PL 87-653.
DPC number 55 was issued on September 28, 1967, an<3-
promulgated a que stion-and-answer section as well as an
example of a properly executed contractor submission of cost
or pricing data (DD Form 633). DPC number 57 was issued on
November 30, 1967, and revised the ASPR to include an
access-to-records clause in firm-fixed-price and fixed-price-
with-escalation types of negotiated contracts. The latter
DPC resulted in the performance of postaward contract audits
as advocated by GAO in all types of negotiated contracts,
but only for the "purpose of determining whether or not
defective cost or pricing data were submitted."-^ DOD com-
menced a training program which included the holding of
seminars, by traveling experts, for contracting personnel and
the publishing of a training course aimed at the correction
of the problems specified in GAO ' s Congressional testimony.
GAO and DCAA Interface
Under its charter, DCAA is expected to maintain
liaison with other components of the Department of Defense,
GAO, Report to Congress, B-39995, February 1967;








other agencies of the executive branch, and GAO for the
exchange of information and programs in the field of assigned
responsibilities. Liaison with GAO for this purpose is
carried on rather extensively at both headquarters and
regional levels. DCAA receives copies of all GAO reports
relating to contract matters and DCAA reviews proposed DOD
responses thereto.
In turn, GAO gives full consideration to the work
of the audit organizations or the contracting agencies con-
cerned. Moreover, the scope and effectiveness of the work
of agency audit organizations on contract and agency
activities are important considerations in determining the
scope and nature of the audit work to be performed by GAO.
By reviewing and testing the audit agency work, GAO often
lessens the amount of its direct audit work. GAO field
personnel are instructed that, in the review of contracts
negotiated on the basis of reviews and evaluations performed
by other agency representatives, they should evaluate such
work. After its reliability has been tested, maximum use
is made of the work of agency personnel, thus limiting the
extent of further work that GAO need.s to do. Because of this,
the efforts of DCAA and GAO are considered complementary.
The institution of the DCAA controlled postaward
auditing program is a GAO sponsored project that has the
approval of Congress. The program relieves GAO of the task




and is an indication of the growing Accounting influence in
procurement matters.
Uniform Cost Accounting
In July, 1968, Senator Proxmire attached an amendment
to the Defense Production Act extension which is of great
import to the auditing activities of GAO and DCAA, and will
bear heavily upon the defense contractors. GAO has been
tasked by the amendment to study the feasibility of applying
uniform cost accounting standards for use in all negotiated
prime contract and subcontract defense procurements of
Si 00, 000 or more.
Why a uniform standard?
This amendment was prompted in part by Vice Admiral
H. G. Rickover ' s testimony that:
1. the lack of uniform accounting standards is
the most serious deficiency in Government procurement
today;
2. industry will not establish such standards
because it is not to their advantage to do so;
$. the accounting profession has had ample time
and opportunity to establish effective standards but
pays only lip service to the concept; and
ll. if uniform accounting standards are ever to
be established the initiative will have to come from
Congress .
1
Admiral Rickover went on to tie the need for uniform stan-
dards of accounting into the Truth in Negotiations Act by
Testimony of Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, USN,
in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency,




before the Committee on Banking and Currency,
Pious e of Representatives, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., April 10 and
11, 1968, pp. 77-83.
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pointing out that "suppliers can inflate the costs they
certify to be in accordance with the Truth in Negotiations
Act, such that it is almost impossible to test what costs
are included in the price, and what profit a contractor can'
realize on the order. For this reason cost breakdowns under
the Truth in Negotiations Act do not preclude overpricing.
"
How to implement the standard
The Comptroller General is approaching the Study
task from the viewpoint that GAO will attempt to determine
the feasibility of applying a uniform cost accounting
standard as a means of enhancing the comparability,
reliability, and consistency of cost data used for negoti-
2
ated contract purposes. Feasibility will be judged in
terms of workability, administrative costs of implementation,
and agreement among accountants of what constitutes







2Elmer B. Staats, "Uniform Cost Accounting Standards
in Negotiated Defense Contracts," The Federal Accountant
,





It is the intent of Chapter VI to answer the research
question, "Why is Public Law 87-653 so difficult to satisfy?"
By drawing on the subsidiary questions and their conclusions,
the reasons for the difficulties in satisfying PL 87-653
should become evident.
What prompted Congress
to pass PL 87-653?
At the conclusion of the Korean Conflict, Congress
became alarmed about the GAO reported continued increase in
negotiated versus formally advertised procurements. By
1955: "tne General Accounting Office audit policy shifted
emphasis from internal Government operations to the area of
defense contracting. In 1957 > GAO commenced issuance of its
now famous blue-book reports, which reported to Congress a
lack of competition in defense contracting and the excess
profits generated by defense contractors.
Representative Carl Vinson, long an adversary of
incentive contracting, began hearings and legislative sub-
missions in an attempt to control incentive contracting.
By 1962, It was inevitable that a law of some sort would be




and apparent deficiencies in Department of Defense procure-
ment policies. The principals in the passage of PL 87-653
—
GAO, DOD, and Senator Russell—agreed that if a law were to
be passed it should control all negotiated contracting and
not incentive contracting alone, which all agreed would be
a greater evil than no law at all.
It is apparent that the GAO generated concern of
Congress about excess profits and DOD's inability to rectify
the problem administratively resulted in the Truth in
Negotiations Act. The haste exhibited in the rewriting of
the final bill (four days) hints at the possibility that the
Act is ill conceived from a legal standpoint and attempts
to explain too much by a single principle—truth. Unanimous
House and Senate passage of the Act does not reflect true
acceptance of the Act. There is a long record of committee
opposition as indicated by the four years it took from first
introduction to passage. The unanimity of the floor votes
only reflects the political truth that a vote against "truth"
is akin to a vote against "motherhood."
Has PL 87-6^3 been fully
implemented by Government
and accepted by industry?
The discussion in Chapter III shows that since 1962,
when the Truth in Negotiations Act was passed by Congress,
there has been continuous administrative change in the regu-
lations that implement the Act. The changes have been
brought about by conflicting as well as complementary ASBCA
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decisions, GAO efforts to bring the ASPR more in line with
its interpretation of the original Act, two amendments to
the Act itself as a result of GAO reports of industry non-
compliance, and finally, the ASPR committee's efforts to
make the ASPR more effective, uniform, and equitable in
administering the Act.
The Act needs time to settle in order to be fully
implemented, and time has not been given to it. It has been
argued that as Government and industry gain experience in
operating under the Act adjustments in implementation become
necessary. Seven years of experience and change should be
sufficient time to smooth out the administrative implementa-
tion of any law.
The trend, of audits .—The General Accounting Office
has long been an advocate of stronger controls on the profits
and the costs of defense contractors. This interest has
been documented from the early GAO shift in audit emphasis
to the present blue-book reports and Congressional testimony
that advocate stronger laws to implement PL 87-653 because
of contractor excesses and DOI) negligence. The result of
GAO ' s efforts for stronger controls and implementation has
taken the form of the Defense Contract Audit Agency. The
DCAA has become a vital part of the implementation process
of PL 87-653, and it is DCAA ' s role as postaward auditor




Admittedly, auditing is the only way to ensure com-
pliance with the law. It is industry's fear that postaward
auditing will lead to the repricing of firm fixed-price
contracts because of "excess" profits. In addition, post-
award auditing has increased the amount of risk that industry
must accept due to the three-year post-contract period that
DCAA is now allowed for auditing.
There has "been a greater emphasis on audit trails
as a means of implementing the Truth in Negotiations Act,
as evidenced by the sample pricing proposal in Defense Pro-
curement Circular 55 and the addition of postaward audit and
record maintenance clauses for fixed-price contracts in
Defense Procurement Circular 57? "t° match the existing cost-
type audit clause. These regulations are the direct result
of GAO's leadership in and responsibility for interpretation
of PL 87-653. All of these audit regulations are to assist
in the implementation of a law which initially had no audit
provision of its own.
As can be seen, the Government is becoming more and
more interested in contractors' records and more deeply
involved in the inner working of contractors' operations.
Such records as minutes of the meetings of boards of direc-
tors and tax returns "if directly pertinent" and "involving




Presently, GAO has been tasked with a feasibility-
study for Congress to determine if "uniform cost accounting
standards" can be instituted in the defense industry. All
indications, from past experience, are that auditing of
contractor records will continue to intensify, as will the
depth of the audits, in order to force implementation and
conformance with the Act. The audits can be used to verify
cost and profit figures in addition to the verification of
contractor submitted cost or pricing data.
Government and industry spokesmen .— One of the
admitted advantages of the Act is its broad principles,
which leave its administration to procurement regulations.
Mr. Staats believes that as we gain experience there will
be more changes to ASPR, although there have already been
2
many regulation changes in this relatively new lav/.
Industry has no quarrel with the objective of the
Act—truth in negotiations. It is the practical implementa-
tion that causes the problem. The basic attribute of
PL 87-655 that impedes industry compliance arises from the
real or imagined uncertainty and one-sidedness of the Act.
This one-sidedness can be illustrated by the following
examples set forth by the Senior Vice President of the
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Mr. Derr:
1. the contractor—alone and without guidance
—
must decide what cost or pricing data may affect price





as well as what cost or pricing data an auditor years
hence may think did, or could have affected price;
2. he has the affirmative obligation of submitting
and/or identifying all such data with the risk of an
inadvertent transgression varying directly with the
complexity of the negotiation and the volume of the
data;
3. if challenged by the government under the
general obligation, he must sustain the burden of
showing that the inaccuracy, incompleteness, or non-
currency of data alleged by the government did not
result in a price increase;
4. if an audit of relevant data discloses a
mixture of offsetting "overs" and "unders" affecting
price he must give to the government the benefit of
all "overs" with only a slim chance of claiming an
offset for "unders."
5. a price reduction attributable to allegedly
inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent data is a
wholly unilateral action by government from which the
contractor may, if he wishes, appeal to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals.!
Mr. Derr, whose organization is a leading spokesman for the
industry viewpoint, believes "that the Truth in Negotiation
law is bad law, poor economics and unsound procurement
policy" and "that it was never needed and should never have
2been enacted.
"
It is doubtful that PL 87-653 will ever be accepted
as a friend of business. Industry objection has not altered
the Act's implementation, and Congress is not disposed to
repeal it. All that can be said is that industry is
resigned to the fact that the Act is here to stay. Efforts
to influence its implementation by logical discussions with
GAO and DOD as well as court tests of various aspects of
the Act appear to be the future course for industry.






The Comptroller General, Mr. Staats, realizes that
present implementation is far from perfect when he admits
that there will be more revisions to the implementing
regulations in the future as we gain experience under the
law. After seven years of effort to implement the Act,
Mr. Staats says, "Perhaps sometime in the future we will
even have substantial agreement between Government and
1industry that the Act is working fairly for both sides."
The question of full implementation will probably
never be answered because of its nebulous quality. What is
full implementation? Is it perfect documentation with an
accurate audit trail? Is it the lowest price to the Govern-
ment with a fair profit to the contractor? Full implemen-
tation Is both of these things, but the cost in time and
dollars to achieve perfect documentation, and an accurate
audit trail can far outweigh the advantage to be gained from
obtaining the lowest possible price. Additionally, no one
has been able to determine what a fair profit is; there are
as many ways to compute profit as there are profit-making
firms.
At this point in time, full implementation has not
been reached, and it is unlikely that it will ever be known
if or when it is reached.
p. 13.




No one denies that truth in government negotiations
is a worthy goal; the problem is how to obtain the "truth"
while maintaining the competitive atmosphere and without
excessive administrative burdens or costs being placed on
Government or industry. The Government procurement situation
is unique and therefore requires unique solutions to its
problems. Without knowledgeable administrators in all phases
of procurement and contracting, on both sides of the negoti-
ation table, the ultimate result will never be achieved.
The ultimate result is the delivery of the right item to
the right place at the right time and at the right price.
If the ultimate result is not firmly kept as the
primary purpose of the Procurement and Contracting endeavor,
such extraneous efforts as perfect documentation and audit
trails will become an end instead of being the means to an
end. Also, it must be remembered that the leveling of new
requirements upon the procurement function, whether it be
Government or industry, does add to the cost of the item
being procured.
"Public Law 87-653 is so difficult to satisfy" because
of the hasty action of Congress in passing the lav/ and the
fact that the lav/ has not been fully implemented by the
government or accepted by industry. It is the firm belief
of this writer that PL 87-653 can never be completely satis-
fied and that a patchwork approach to Improved implementation
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will only aggravate the implementation. Unless the law is
understood it cannot be fully implemented, and if it is not
implemented it cannot satisfy the intentions of Congress in
passing the Act, i.e., to bring truth to the negotiating
table. The goal of PL 87-653 is an admirable one, and the
need for the exchange of pertinent information at the time
of negotiations does exist, but this Act will not attain that
goal without the expenditure of time and money that far
exceeds the value returned.

APPENDIX A
SECTION (e) OF THE TKUTH IN
NEGOTIATIONS ACT

THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATION ACT
SECTION (e) OF PUBLIC LAW 87-653
(10 use 2306(f))
A prime contractor or any subcontractor shall be required to
submit cost or pricing data under the circumstances listed below, and
shall be required to certify that, to the best of his knowledge and
belief, the cost or pricing data he submitted was accurate, complete and
current
—
(1) Prior to the award of any negotiated prime contract under
this title where the price is expected to exceed $100,000;
(2) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modifica-
tion for which. .the price adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000,
or such lesser amount as may be prescribed by the head of the agency;
(3) Prior to the award of a subcontract at any tier, where
the prime contractor and each higher tier subcontractor have been
required to furnish such a certificate, if the price of such sub™
contract is expected to exceed $100,000; or
(h). Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modifica-
tion to a subcontract covered by (3) above, for which the price
adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount
as may be prescribed by the head of the agency.
Any prime contract or change or modification thereto under
which such certificate is required shall contain a provision that the
price to the Government, including profit or fee, shall be adjusted to
exclude any significant sums by which it may be determined by the head
of the agency that such price was increased because the contractor or
any subcontractor required to furnish such a certificate, furnished
cost or pricing data which, as of a date agreed upon between the parties
(which date shall be as close to the date of agreement on the negotiated
price as is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent:
Provided, That the requirements of this subsection need not be applied
to contracts or subcontracts where the price negotiated is based on
adequate price competition, established catalog or market prices of com-
mercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public,
prices set by lav; or regulation or, in exceptional cases where the head
of the agency determines that the requirements of this subsection may be




AMENDMENT TO SECTION (e) OF THE
TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT

AMENDMENT TO THE TRUTH IN NEGOTIATIONS ACT
SECTION (e) OF PUBLIC LAW 87-653
(10 USC 2306 [f]
)
For the purpose of evaluating the accuracy, com-
pleteness, and currency of cost or pricing data required
to be submitted by this subsection, any authorized repre-
sentative of the head of the agency who is an employee of
the United States Government shall have the right, until
the expiration of three years after final payment under
the contract or subcontract, to examine all books, records,
documents, and other data of the contractor or subcontractor
related to the negotiation, pricing, or performance of the
contract or subcontract.








PRICE NEGOTIATION POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES
(2) Appropriate consideration should be given to Section XV 5 which
contains general cost principles and procedures for the iron an
lowance of costs in connection with the negotiation of cost-reimbursement type
contracts, as well as guidelines for use, where appropriate, in the evaluation of
costs in connection with negotiated fixed-price type contracts.
(3) Among the evaluations that should be made where the necessary
date are available, are comparisons of a contractor's or offeror's current esti-
mated costs with
:
(i) actual costs previously incurred by the contractor or offeror;
(ii) his- last prior cost estimate for the same or similar item or a series
of prior estimates;
(iii) current cost estimates from other possible sources; and
(iv) prior estimates or historical costs of other contractors manufactur-
ing the same or similar items.
(4) Forecasting future trends in costs from historical cost experience is
of primary importance. In periods of either rising or declining costs, an ade-
quate cost analysis must include some evaluation of the trends. In cases in-
volving production of recently developed, complex equipment, even in periods
of relative price stability, trend analysis of basic labor and materials costs
should be undertaken.
3-807.3 Cost or Pricing Data. DPC #57
(a) The contracting ofticer shall require the contractor to submit in
writing cost or pricing data and to certify, by use of the certificate set forth
in 3-807.4, that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing
data he submitted was accurate, complete, and current prior to:
(i) the award of any cost-reimbursement type, time and material,
labor-hour, incentive, or price redeterminable contract regardless
of dollar amount; except that certification of the data shall not
be required in connection with cost and cost-sharing contracts, the
estimated cost of which does not exceed $100,000, and under which
the contractor receives no fee;
(ii) the award of any firm fixed-price or fixed-price, with escalation
negotiated contract expected to exceed $100,000 in amount;
(iii) any contract modification expected to exceed $100,000 in amount
to any formally advertised or negotiated contract whether or not
cost or pricing data was required in connection with the initial
pricing of the contract;
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(iv) the award of any negotiated contract not expected to exceed
$100,000 in amount or any contract modification not expected to
exceed $100,000 in amount to any formally advertised or negotiated
contract whether or not cost or pricing data was required in con-
nection with the initial pricing of the contract, provided the
contracting officer considers that the circumstances warrant such
action in accordance with (d) below;
unless, in the case of (ii), (iii) or (iv), the price negotiated is based on ade-
quate price competition, established catalog or market prices of commeixial
items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, or prices set by law
or regulation. The requirements under (i), (ii), and (iii) above, may be
waived in exceptional cases where the Secretary (or, in the case of a contract
with a foreign government or agency thereof, the Head of a Procuring Ac-
tivity) authorizes such waiver and states in writing his reasons for such
determination. Whenever a Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data is
required, the applicable clause in 7-104.29 shall be included in the contract,
and the appropriate clauses in 7-104.41 and 7-104.42 shall be used if required
in accordance with those paragraphs.
(b) Any contractor who has been required to submit and certify cost or
pricing data in accordance with (a) above shall also be required to obtain cost
or pricing data from his subcontractors under the circumstances set forth in
the appropriate clause in 7-104.42.
(c) When there is adequate price competition, cost or pricing data shall
not be requested regardless of the dollar amount involved. As a general rule,
cost or pricing data should not be requested when it has been determined that
proposed prices are, or are based on, established catalog or market prices of
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public. Where,
however, despite the willingness of a number of commercial purchasers to buy
an item at such a catalog or market price, the purchaser (e.g., the contracting
officer) finds that that price is not reasonable and supports such finding by an
enumeration of the facts upon which it is based, cost or pricing data may be
requested if necessary to establish a reasonable price; provided, that such find-
ing is approved at a level above the contracting officer. In addition, cost or
pricing data may bo requested, if necessary, where there is such a disparity
between the quantity being procured and the quantity for which there is such
a catalog or market price that pricing cannot reasonably be accomplished by
comparing the two. Where an item is substantially similar to a commercial
item for which there is an established catalog or market price at which sub-
stantial quantities are sold to the general public, but the offered price of the
former is not considered to be "based on" the price of the latter in accordance
with 3-807.1 (b) (2), any requirement for cost or pricing data should be lim-
ited to that pei'taining to the differences between the items if this limitation
is consistent with assuring reasonableness of pricing result.
[The next page is 358.3]
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(d) The provisions of this subparagraph (d) do not apply to awards
covered by (a) (i) above. Cost or pricing data shall not be requested prior to
the award of any contract anticipated to be for $2,500 or less and generally
should not be requested for modifications in those amounts. In procurements
where it is anticipated that the contract award or modification will be between
$2,500 and $10,000, cost or pricing data generally should not be requested. In
almost all awards between $2,500 and $10,000 and modifications of $10,000
or less, the administrative costs will outweigh the pricing benefits which might
otherwise accrue and some form of price analysis is almost always adequate
in these situations. With respect to procurements where the amount of the
award or modification is anticipated to be between $10,000 and $100,000, cost
analysis and the obtaining of cost or pricing data from contractors shall be
limited to cases where no satisfactory method of price analysis can be found.
(e) "Cost or pricing data 1 " as used in this Part refers to that portion
of the contractor's submission which is factual. The requirement for "cost or
pricing data" subject to certification is satisfied when all facts reasonably
available to the contractor up to the time of agreement on price and which
might reasonably be expected to affect the price negotiations are accurately
disclosed to the contracting officer or his representative. The definition of cost
or pricing data embraces more than historical accounting data; it also in-
cludes, where applicable, such factors as vendor quotations, nonrecurring
costs, changes in production methods and production or procurement volume,
unit cost trends such as those associated with labor efficiency, and m;'ke-or-buy
decisions or any other management decisions which could reasonably be ex-
pected to have a significant bearing on costs under the proposed contract. In
short, cost or pricing data consist of all facts which can reasonably be ex-
pected to contribute to sound estimates of future costs as well as to the validity
of costs already incurred. Cost or pricing data, being factual, is that type of
information which can be verified. Because the contractor's certificate pertains
to "cost or pricing data,*' it docs not make representations as to the accuracy
of the contractor's judgment as to the estimated portion of future costs or
projections. It does, however, apply to the data upon which the contractor's
judgment is based. This distinction between fact and judgment should ba
clearly understood.
ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATION fi 3-307.3
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3-807.4 Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data. When a certifi-
cation of cost or pricing data is required in accordance with 3-807.3, a certifi-
cate in the form set forth below shall be included in the contract file along
with the memorandum of the negotiation. The contractor shall be required to
submit the certificate as soon as practicable after agreement is reached on the
contract price.
CERTIFICATE OF CURRENT COST OR PRICING DATA (OCT. 1964)
This is to certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, cost or pricing
data* submitted to the Contracting Officer or his representative in support of






* For definition of "cost or pricing data", see ASPR 3-807.3 (e).
** Describe the proposal, quotation, request for price adjustments, or other sub-
mission involved, giving appropriate identifying number (e.g., KIT No. ).
*** As a general rule, this due should be the date when the contract price was
agreed to. It is not intended that, personal knowledge of the contractor's negoti itoi
limits the responsibility of the contractor if the contractor bad available at the time
of the agreement information showing that the negotiated price is not based on
accurate, complete, and current data. Contractors are expected to make a reason-
able check to ascertain whether the concern had any information not personally
known to the contractor's negotiator at the time of the agreement and which in
accordance with ASPR-3-807.3 should be disclosed to the contracting officer for his
consideration. Contractors are not expected to make a complete recheck of all data
or develop a new cost estimate after the date of agreement- and prior to execution
of the contract. However, execution of a Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data
is not intended to relieve a contractor of the responsibility for disclosing circum-
stances or events, happening subsequent to the date of certification but known to the
contractor prior to the date of contract execution, which could reasonably be expected
to have a significant bearing on costs under the proposed contract.
[The next page is 359]
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3-807.5 Defective Cost or Pricing Data. DPC #57
(a) Where any price to the Government, including profit or fee and in-
cluding price adjustments, must be negotiated largely on the basis of cost or
pricing data furnished by the contractor, it is essential that all data that
might reasonably affect the price negotiations be disclosed and that such data
.be accurate, complete, and cm-rent (see 3-807.3 and 3-807.4). If an agreed
price includes amounts which can only be attributed to erroneous or incomplete
cost or pricing data, it is not a fair price and the resultant profits are not earned
profits. Where negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of full disclosure,
failure of one party to proceed on that basis undercuts full mutual assent to
the price negotiated so that, in this sense, the price is not fully agreed to, and
fairness warrants its adjustment. The clauses set forth in 7-104.29 are de-
signed to give the Government in such a case an enforceable contract right to
a price adjustment, that is, to a reduction in the price to what it demonstrably
would have been if the contractor had not failed to disclose significant and
reasonably available data or had not furnished defective data.
(b) Under 10 U.S.C. 2306(f) and the "Price Reduction for Defective
Cost or Pricing Data" clauses set forth in 7-104.29, the Government's right to
reduce the prime contract price extends to cases where the prime contract
price was increased by any significant sums because a subcontractor furnished
defective cost or pricing data in connection with a subcontract where a certifi-
cate of cost or pricing data was or should have been furnished. These clauses
also provide that the prime contractor and higher tier subcontractors shall
include similar clauses in certain of their subcontracts to provide them with
comparable rights to price reductions. In order to secure price reductions
based on defective cost or pricing data furnished by a subcontractor, however,
the Government, the prime contractor or higher tier subcontractor must be
able to show that cost or pricing data furnished by subcontractors was, in
fact defective. In some cases, as where the defective nature of a subcon-
tractor's data is only disclosed by Government audit, the information necessary
to support a reduction in prime contract and subcontractor prices may be
available only from the Government. To the extent necessary to secure a
prime contract price reduction, the contracting .officer should make such neces-
sary information available upon request, to the prime contractor or higher
tier subcontractors; however, if the release of such information would com-
promise military security or disclose trade secrets or other confidential business
information, it shall be made available only under conditions that will fully
protect it from improper disclosure, as may be prescribed by: the Director of
Procurement, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations
and Logistics), for the Army; the Office of Naval Material, for the Navy; the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force; and the Executive Director,
Procurement and Production, for the Defense Supply Agency. Information
made available pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to that used as the
basis for the prime contract price reduction.
ARMED SERVICES PROCUREMENT REGULATION S 2-S07.5
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(c) Inasmuch as price reductions under the Price Reduction for Defective
Cost or Pricing Data clauses may involve first- and lower-tier subcontractors
as well as the prime contractor, the contracting officer should give the prime
contractor reasonable advance notice before making a determination to reduce
the contract price under such clauses, in order to afford the prime contractor
an opportunity to take any action deemed advisable by him, particularly in
connection with any subcontracts that may be involved.
3-807.6 Refusal To Provide Cost or Pricing Data. If cost or pricing data
from the contractor is required to permit adequate analysis of the contractor's
proposal in accordance with 3-S07.3 and the contractor has refused to provide
such data, the contracting officer shall use those means available to him to
attempt to secure such data. If the contractor persists in his refusal to pro-
vide necessary data, the contracting officer shall withhold making the award
or price adjustment. In such event, lie shall refer the procurement action to
higher echelons of the Department. Such referral shall include a complete
statement of the attempts made to resolve the matter, including (i) steps taken
to secure essential cost data, (ii) efforts to secure the contractor's cooperation in
the establishment of a satisfactory business relationship, (iii) any assurances
offered, such as agreements to adequately safeguard information furnished, and
(iv) a statement concerning the practicability of obtaining the supplies or
services from another source of supply.
3-S07.7 Unacceptable Substitutes for Pricing Negotiations. A Certificate
of Current Cost or Pricing Data (see 3-807.4) shall not be considered a
substitute for examination and analysis of the contractor's proposal. Con-
tracting officers shall not rel}' on profit limiting statutes as remedies for ineffec-
tive pricing.
3-807.8 Evaluation and Pricing of Individual Contreicis. Each contract
shall be priced separately and independently, and no consideration shall be
given to losses or profits realized or anticipated hi the performance of other
contracts. This prohibition neither prevents the negotiation of fixed overhead
and other rates applicable to several contracts during annual or other specific
periods nor prohibits forward pricing agreements applicable to several con-
tracts. A proposed price reduction under another contract or other contracts
shall not be used as an evaluation factor.
3-807.9 Specified Contingencies. When a contract is to include a pro-
vision for adjustment of price upon the happening of a specified contingency
(e.g., escalation clauses, Government-furnished property clauses, tax clauses),
the contract price should not include any amount on account of such con-
tingency.
3-807.10 Sulcontracting Considerations in Cost Analysis.
(a) The amount and quality of subcontracting may be a major factor in-
fluencing price. Since a large proportion of the procurement dollar is spent
by prime contractors in subcontracting for work, raw materials, parts, and
components, efficient purchasing practices by a contractor will contribute
heavily toward efficient and economic production. While basic responsibility
rests with the prime contractor for decisions to make or buy, for selection of
subcontractors, and for subcontract prices and subcontract performance, the
[The next r.v i J 0.1]
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